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THE CANONISTIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE
WESTERN RIGHTS TRADITION: AN
HISTORICAL INQUIRY-
CHARLES J. REID, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
This is an article about rights in thirteenth century canon law.
Such a premise is not uncontroversial, at least among historians and
theorists of rights. Historians of the concept of rights have tradi-
tionally asserted that the western rights tradition originated in either
the seventeenth century or the fourteenth century. The thirteenth
century, with one notable exception,' has not been seriously consid-
ered as a source for the western rights tradition.
Those who argue for a seventeenth century origin associate the
rise of the western rights tradition with the individualist philoso-
phers of early modern England, preeminently John Locke and
Thomas Hobbes. This school of thought typically ties the articula-
tion of rights to the rise of a market economy and the emergence
of an unprecedented atomized individualism. 2 This view of the
t Copyright C 1991 Charles J. Reid, Jr.
* Research associate in law and history, School of Law, Emory University. B.A., Univer-
sity of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, 1978; J.D., Catholic University of America, 1982; J.C.L.,
Catholic University of America, 1985; M.A., Cornell University, 1987. I would like to ac-
knowledge first the contributions of Professor Brian Tierney whose comments were indis-
pensable in the preparation of this paper. Harold Berman, Peter Dear, Bruce Frohnen, Alice
Hearst, R.H. Helmholz, Paul R. Hyams, William P. Hyland, David Lyons and William Wagner
provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. Diane Alampi, Lesa Carter, Willard Dickerson,
Lynn Laufenberg, Laura Mellinger and Andrew Wilson also provided helpful advice and
encouragement. The remaining errors are entirely the author's own. A portion of this paper
was written with the assistance of a fellowship from the Lane Cooper Foundation.
' The exception is Richard Tuck. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Tuck's historiography.
Harold J. Berman has discussed the emergence of individual rights and the proliferation
of rights-based claims beginning at the close of the eleventh century. See LAW AND REVOLU-
TION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). Urban charters, for ex-
ample, contain recurrent mention of liberties and rights. See id. at 364-67. Berman, however,
does not explore the development of the concept of individual rights and the function of
that concept in the legal systems of the high middle ages.
The present article builds on Brian Tierney's investigations of the concept of rights and
the role rights played in European jurisprudence from the twelfth century on. See infra notes
53-56,88 and accompanying text.
I Two scholars central to the development of this view are C.B. MacPherson and Leo
Strauss. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of MacPherson and
Strauss.
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origin of rights, which sees rights, free market economics and in-
dividualism as intricately intertwined, has come to shape many of
the expectations and presuppositions of both the defenders 5
 and
critics4
 of modern liberalism.
Those who assert a fourteenth century origin for the western
rights tradition, on the other hand, tend to be continental and
conservative. 5 According to this school of thought, Thomas Aquinas
created a harmonious philosophical order that had at its heart an
objectively just division of goods, not discordant assertions of sub-
jective rights. Suspicious of modern and early modern forms of
individualism, this school of thought nominates William of Ockham
as the creator of the western rights tradition and the destroyer of
the prior Thomistic harmony. in this school of thought, a line can
3 See, e.g., LOREN F. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 49-50
(1987); WALTER BERNS, IN DEFENSE OF. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 37-46 (1984); Robert E. Lane,
Individualism and the Market Society, in 25 NoMos: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 374 ( J. Roland Pennock
and John W. Chapman eds., 1983). Relying on a single Victorian-era caricature, Lane asserts
that medieval society was "traditional" in the sense that notions of individuality were not well
developed. Lane seems to assume that the Age of Enlightenment represents a decisive turning
point in the development of modern forms of individualism. Of course, such a term as
"individualism" is inherently difficult to define or confine. For a cogent argument that the
middle ages were of decisive importance in the emergence of modern individualism, see
COLIN MORRIS, THE DISCOVERY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 1050-1200 (1972).
This is not to assert that the medieval canonists were proto-liberals. Locke's notion of
religious tolerance and Mill's distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts,
for example, would have been quite alien to medieval canonistic thought. Rather, the point
is that the association between liberalism and rights is a historically contingent one, and the
western rights tradition substantially predates the advent of modern or early modern forms
of liberalism. The early history of the association between rights and liberalism remains
inadequately studied, if only because the pre-seventeenth century history of the western
rights tradition has yet to receive sufficient scholarly attention.
4 The critical legal studies ("CLS") movement has provided perhaps the most sustained
critique of liberalism and rights. A good introduction to the CLS arguments is found in
Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEL L. REV. 1363 (1984). Morton Horwitz's essay, Rights,
typifies the historiographical assumptions that undergird much of the CLS critique. See 23,
HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988). Like his liberal interlocutors, Horwitz simply assumes
that the concept of rights emerged as part of seventeenth century liberalism, and that it
developed in opposition to a prior "discredited" natural law tradition. As this article will
demonstrate, the historiography is considerably more complex. The "left," however, is far
from univocal on the subject of rights. See, for example, the compelling defense of rights
by Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 901 (1987). Williams has recently developed her argument further in THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 148-65 (1991),
5 Michel Villey is probably the leading exponent of this viewpoint. See infra notes 56-
85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Villey's position. A second example of this
school of thought is Louts LACHANCE, LE DROIT ET LES DROITS DE L'HOMME (1959).
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be drawn from Ockham's rights-based polemics to the excesses of
the French Revolution and eventually to modern "excesses."
The chief difficulty with these two schools of thought, from the
standpoint of a working medievalist, is that rights are readily iden-
tifiable in the legal systems of thirteenth century Europe. Confining
the inquiry to medieval canon law, one encounters recurrent men-
tion of the rights of bishops,' metropolitans (archbishops), 8 cardi-
nals,9 popes,'° and even perpetual vicars." Monastic exemption was
put in terms of rights,' 2 patrons exercised the right of patronage,' 3
and spouses had the right to demand the conjugal debt." Nor was
canon law alone. Other medieval European legal systems, such as
English common law, also made recurrent references to rights.' 3
How has this anomaly arisen? Are medievalists unreflectively
transposing a modern rights vocabulary onto resistant sources? In
some cases they are, ' 6 but in most instances the sources 'permit such
a translation. Have historians of rights overlooked a significant body
of materials? This latter alternative is the correct answer. It appears
that historians of rights, conditioned to expect that the most signif-
icant debates over rights will be found in philosophical treatises of
scholars like Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham, simply have not suffi-
ciently considered juristic sources. In fact, a close scrutiny of juristic
6 See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Villey's arguments
on behalf of a fourteenth century origin for the western rights tradition.
7 Ste generally KENNETH PENNINGTON, POPE AND BISHOPS: THE l'Axat. MONARCHY IN THE
TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES (1984).
See generally ROBERT BRENTANO, YORK METROPOLITAN JURISDICTION (1959); ALPHONSE
POPEK, THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF METROPOLITANS (1948).
9 Tierney, Hostiensis and Collegiality, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL
CANON LAW 401 (1972).
10 Othmar Hagender, Das päpstliche Recht der Farstenabesetzung, 1 ARCHIVUM HISTORIAE
PONTIFICIAE 53 (1963).
" CARL GROSS, DAS RECHT AN DER PFRUNDE (1887).
19 David Knowles, The Growth of Monastic Exemption, 50 DOWNSIDE Rxv. 201 (1932).
II PETER LANDAU, JUS PATRONATUS: STUDIEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNC DES PATRONATS IM
DEKRETALENRECHT UND DER KANONISTIK DES 12 UND 13 JAtutuutumars (1975).
14 JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 358-
60 (1987).
L5 See generally PAUL R. HYAMS, KING, LORDS AND PEASANTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE
COMMON LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES (1980). This
work contains recurrent mention of rights in medieval English common law.
113 Clarence Gallagher, for example, imposes a modern rights vocabulary where the
original sources do not permit it. See CLARENCE GALLAGHER, CANON LAW AND THE CHRISTIAN
COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE CHURCH ACCORDING TO THE SUMMA AUREA OF
HOSTIENSIS (1978). Gallagher's error is a common one. He frames modern moral and
jurisprudential aspirations in terms of rights and then imposes this framework on his sources.
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materials reveals a sophisticated understanding of rights already
operative in the legal systems of twelfth and thirteenth century
Europe. This understanding of rights would become part of the
medieval jus commune, the common law of Europe, 17 that would in
turn inform the polemical works of William of Ockham and the
writings of early modern philosophers and theologians—figures  as
diverse and seminal in their own right as John Locke and John
Calvin. 18
To make such a claim on behalf of the canonists raises further
difficulties. The canonists never wrote any treatises on rights. Al-
though the notion of individual rights played a significant role in
the system of law the canonists developed, it was also a concept that
went largely, but not entirely, without formal analysis. This, then,
raises the question of how we are to know whether the canonists
actually made use of the concept of individual rights. What words,
if any, carried the meaning of individual right in thirteenth century
canon law and what were their limitations?
These difficulties might be resolved through recourse to ana-
lytical philosophy. Since the time of Jeremy Bentham, a large body
of analysis has been produced probing the scope, meaning and
function of the term "right." This article employs this body of
literature to elucidate the canonistic usage of "right." The canonists
had a well-refined rights vocabulary that they employed in a so-
phisticated and "modern" fashion. 19 By applying the insights of
modern rights analysis to canonistic sources, this article hopes to
establish the existence of a system of rights at a time earlier than
commonly supposed and to sketch out some of the larger features
of the canonistic rights theory.
This article, however, does not engage in a philosophical de-
fense either of the canonists' concept of individual rights or of the
analytical philosophers whose works are applied to canon law. The
article assumes the essential accuracy of the analytical philosophy it
17 See MANLIO BELLOMO, L'EUROPA DEL Dmirro COMUNE (3d ed. 1989) for a discussion
of medieval European common law, the "learned" Roman and canon law taught in the
universities of western Europe. The Roman and canon law, while sharing substantial simi-
larities, also differed in some significant respects. The canon law, for example, continued to
grow through the legislative activities of the popes, while Roman law was generally considered
subject to reinterpretation but not legislative amendments. For a discussion of the similarities
and differences, see BERMAN, supra note 1, at 204-05.
18
 A helpful study of the twelfth century origins of western constitutionalism and the
transmission of constitutional ideas to the seventeenth century may be found in BRIAN
TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH Or CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 1150-1650 (1982).
la See infra notes 121-60.
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employs. Chiefly a working medievalist myself, my purpose in this
paper is essentially descriptive. This article's main function is to
make visible the basic contours of the canonistic rights theory. 2°
This paper is divided into three major sections. Section I ac-
quaints readers with the major canonistic sources of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. Section II reviews the major schools of histo-
riography on the question of the origin of the western rights tra-
dition. The reason for including such a review in this paper is to
make clear both the presuppositions that have informed this his-
toriography and the deficiencies that have flawed it. Section III
"sketches out" some of the major components of the canonistic
rights theory. This section begins with an application of Hohfeldian
jural categories to the canonistic rights vocabulary. The canon law
of marriage is then utilized as a vehicle for reviewing other elements
of canonistic usages of rights. The article concludes that canon law
possessed a sophisticated system of rights at a time earlier than
commonly supposed by historians of rights and suggests that the
western rights tradition is a far deeper historical phenomenon than
previously thought.
I. THE CANONISTS
A. Gratian
This paper focuses on the developed canon law of the thir-
teenth century. Nonetheless, one ought to consider the period
20 Other disclaimers are in order. This paper is not comprehensive. A thorough discus.
sion of canonistic rights theory would be a very large undertaking, and so the use of both
medieval and modern sources has necessarily been selective. Although a certain subjectivity
is unavoidable in any exercise of selectivity, the examples chosen here—from canonistic
election law, medieval poor law and marriage law, among other topics—demonstrate the wide
variety of legal issues influenced by the canonistic concern for rights.
This article does not claim that the western rights tradition originated with the canonists
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is quite possible, indeed likely, that the western
rights tradition has a variety of sources. Some of the possible sources are reviewed at the
conclusion of this paper. It suffices for the purposes of this article, however, to assert that
the canon law of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is a major and hitherto neglected source
of the western rights tradition.
Finally, this article does not attempt to use historical research as a means of claiming a
particularly ancient lineage for a given approach to rights, thereby asserting some alleged
superiority of one approach over alternative approaches. Similarly, this article will not argue
that the canonistic sources, simply because they antedate Locke or Hobbes or Ockham, are
somehow better than their successors. Rather, the hope is that a conversation may be stim-
ulated between medievalists and,modern theorists of rights. In some small way, we may thus
come to an enriched understanding of the western rights tradition—a tradition dating back
at least to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
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1140-1348 as a unit. The probable publication date of Gratian's
Decretum was 1140, while 1348 is the year in which Johannes An-
dreae, one of the leading canonists of the fourteenth century, died
of bubonic plague." These two centuries witnessed the emergence
of canon law as a systematized and autonomous discipline, with a
theoretical framework that occasionally overlapped with, but was
also distinct from, other disciplines such as theology and philoso-
phy. 22
Gratian, an obscure figure about whom very little is known, 23
was the medieval lawyer who first gave a coherent shape to canon
law. Canon law, at the time Gratian worked, was a tangled mass of
sources. Excerpts from patristic authors such as Augustine and
Jerome, canons from a variety of church councils, penitential texts
and papal decretal letters were all considered more or less norma-
tive in the early twelfth century, prior to the issuance of the Deere-
turn. Much of this material, the output of nearly one thousand years
of church history, was hopelessly contradictory.
Gratian set for himself the task of organizing these sources.
The end product of Gratian's labor, the Concordia Discordantium
Canonum (known as the Decretum), is a massive work in three parts.
Part I, consisting of 101 distinctions, is concerned chiefly with inter-
nal ecclesiastical order. Part II, comprising 36 causae or cases, covers
a wide variety of topics ranging from marriage to the law of warfare.
Each of these causae opens with a hypothetical fact pattern followed
by a series of questions probing the legal issues implicated by the
fact pattern—a method not unfamiliar to law professors today. Part
III, the Treatise on Consecration, briefly treats issues in liturgical and
sacramental law.
Common to most of the Decretum is an emphasis on dialectical
reasoning. Contradictory texts are arranged in patterns that make
21 The period 1140-1348 is frequently referred to as the "classic age of canon law."
This is, for example, the tide and theme of GABRIEL LEBRAS, L'AGE CLASSIQUE, 1140-1348,
7 HISTOIRE DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS DE LIGLISE EN OCCIDENT (1965). POT the death
of Johannes Andreae, see S. Stellung-Michaud, Jean D'Andri, 6 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT
CANONIQUE 89-90 (1957).
/2 See BERMAN, supra note 1.
23 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of the
Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35 TaAorrio 145 (1979). Noonan provides an incisive review
of most of the available biographical data. See also STANLEY CHODOROW, CHRISTIAN POLITICAL
THEORY AND CHURCH POLITICS IN THE MID-TWELFTH CENTURY: THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF GRA-
TIAN'S DECRETUM (1972). Brundage also provides helpful biographical detail. See supra note
14, at 229-33. Brundage represents the most recent synthesis of the growing historiography
on the canonists themselves and the following summary is indebted to that synthesis.
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obvious their contradictions. Gratian then attempted, through sys-
tematic analysis, to find solutions to the problems these texts posed.
His reasoning is set out in dicta that follow or precede particular
textual excerpts. Although Gratian's answers are not invariably bril-
liant, they provided a valuable starting point for subsequent discus-
sion.24
B. The Decretists
Gratian's Decretum proved to be wildly popular. Its publication
coincided with the emergence of a learned legal culture in a number
of parts of western Europe. 25 It was utilized quickly by law profes-
sors at Bologna, Paris, the Rhineland, Oxford and elsewhere26 as a
leading text as well as a focus for commentaries.
Those legal commentators who worked on the Decretum became
known as the decretists. Although commentaries on the Decretum
continued to be produced into the thirteenth century, decretist
commentary flourished between about 1140 and 1190. The decre-
tists had two chief concerns: to resolve inconsistencies either left
unresolved by Gratian or implicit within his commentary, and to fill
in the gaps left open by Gratian." Although they are barely known
today, a number of these scholars were enormously creative, influ-
ential figures. An author like Huguccio of Pisa, for example, had a
profoundly important role in shaping the western constitutional
tradition. He is rarely noticed today, however, as his work remains
in manuscript. 28
C. Decretal Collections
Popes began to issue increasing numbers of decretal letters in
the mid-twelfth century. These decretal letters had features one
might associate with both case law and statutory law. Often, decretals
were issued to resolve particular cases or controversies and were
thus quite fact-dependent. At the same time, they also frequently
contained rather detailed legislative prescriptions. Some of the more
24 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 229-33.
22 BERMAN, supra note 1.
28 See BRUNDAGE, Supra note 14, at 256-60 for a recent helpful review of these schools
together with a thorough bibliography.
27 On the chief characteristics and concerns of the decretists, see R. NAZ, 4 DICTIONNAIRE
DE DROIT CANONIQUE 1065-67 (1949).
28 See TIERNEY, supra note 18, at 15-19 for a brief review of some of Huguccio's
contributions to constitutional thought.
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elaborate decretals of popes like Alexander III or Innocent III
nearly parallel in structure judicial opinions such as Miranda v.
Arizona and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. 29
By the latter years of the twelfth century, however, a problem
had become readily apparent. Decretals issued to resolve particular
controversies were scattered throughout Europe. No effort had
been made to draw these decretals together into larger collections.
This problem was addressed in the latter years of the twelfth cen-
tury as legal scholars and practitioners began to assemble collections.
The first decretal collections were private endeavors by individual
lawyers. Innocent III, however, published an official collection of
his decretal letters, as did Honorius III. Altogether five collections,
known as the Quinque Compilationes Antiquae, gained wide circulation
prior to 1234.
The Liber Extra, the most important canonistic text since Gra-
tian's Decretum, was promulgated in 1234. Pope Gregory IX com-
missioned Liber Extra as a comprehensive, definitive law text to take
the place of the five older compilations. The decretal letters in-
cluded in Liber Extra were those issued in the more than ninety
years that had elapsed since the appearance of Gratian's work, as
well as some earlier material. The letters included in Liber Extra
were edited carefully and extraneous material was deleted. Liber
Extra was meant to be binding law; it remained in effect as binding
ecclesiastical law until 1917."
The Liber Extra was followed in 1298 by Boniface VIII's pub-
lication of the Liber Sextus. Liber Sextus was a selected compilation of
decretal letters bridging the period 1234-1298. In turn, Liber Sextus
was followed by the publication of two smaller fourteenth century
collections, the Clementine and the Extravagantes Johannis XXII. The
body of canon law that would emerge from the middle ages, the
Corpus furls Canonici, was completed in 1501 with the publication of
the Extravagantes Communes. 3 '
" See Charles Donahue, Jr., Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs.
Maitland Reexamined After 75 Years in the Light of Some Records from the Church Courts, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 647, 680-99 (1974) for a discussion of the structure of papal decretals and their
similarities both to case law and legislation. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
3° For Liber Extra's continued authority within the Roman Catholic Church, see Blum-
DACE, supra note 14, at 327.
" See AMLETO G. CICOGNANI, CANON LAW 273-321 (1935) for a helpful thumbnail
sketch of the major phases in the development of the Corpus furls Canonici.
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D. The Decretalists
From around the turn of the thirteenth century, commentators
had been at work analyzing the contents of the various decretal
letters. These commentaries reached a new sophistication with the
promulgation of Liber Extra. The commentators' method was the
close analysis of texts; they would look for inconsistencies within
particular letters or between different letters. They also attempted
to reconcile prior material found in the Decretum with the Liber
Extra. 32
 Three commentators especially stand out and will be the
focus of this paper.
The first of these, Bernard of Parma, was born around 1200.
Bernard spent most of his legal career in the academy. A professor
of law at Bologna, Bernard was the author of the Ordinary Gloss—
the standard commentary to the decretals of Gregory 1X. This
commentary was typically copied together with the Liber Extra and
was used as the standard teaching text in the schools. Bernard of
Parma died in 1266. 33
Innocent IV (Sinibaldo Fieschi) was a well-trained and active
canonist, although he apparently never taught. Instead, he made a
career for himself in the papal bureaucracy. Innocent was named a
cardinal as a young man in 1227, and was elected pope in 1243. He
wrote his Commentaria to Liber Extra in his spare moments while
serving as pope. He died in 1254."
Finally, Hostiensis (Henry of Susa), like Innocent IV, made a
career largely in ecclesiastical administration, teaching only briefly
at the University of Paris. He was elected successively Bishop of
Sisteron, Archbishop of Embrun, and Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia, and
also served on a number of important papal diplomatic missions.
He composed both a Summa, published in 1253, and a Lectura to
the Liber Extra, completed in 1271, while engaged in the practical
affairs of church management. He died in 1271. 35
32 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 326-29.
33 See J.A. CLARENCE SMITH, MEDIEVAL LAW TEACHERS AND WRITERS 46 (1975) for
biographical details on Bernard. See Stephan Kuttner and Beryl Smalley, The Glossa Ordinaria
to the Gregorian Decretals, 60 ENG. HIST. REV. 97-101 (1945), and Stephan Kuttner, Notes on
the Glossa Ordinaria of Bernard of Parma, II BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 86 (1981) for a review
of textual issues in the Glossa Ordinaria.
m For Innocent's biography, see CLARENCE SMITH, supra note 33, at 45-46, and J.A
Cantini and Charles Lefebvre, Sinibalde del Fieschi (Innocent IV), 7 DICTIONNAIRE OF nitorr
CANONIQUE 1029 (1965).
33 For Hostiensis's biography, see CLARENCE SMITH, supra note 33, at 46-47. The follow-
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The thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were rich in
canonistic commentaries. As noted above, the classic age came to
an end only in 1348 with the death of Johannes Andreae." By
selecting Innocent, Bernard and Hostiensis, this article, rather than
tracing developments over a number of years, provides a sort of
"snapshot" of rights at work in the canonistic system. In terms of
the thoroughness and subtlety of their commentaries as well as their
subsequent influence, Hostiensis, Bernard of Parma and Innocent
IV can be termed the most important of the thirteenth century
decretalists. By examining the role of rights in their juristic thought,
this article will delineate the main features of the decretalist analysis
of rights.
II. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RIGHTS
It is a rather novel idea to suggest that thirteenth century canon
law had a well developed understanding of individual rights. After
all, an earlier generation of historians argued that canon law was
largely a justification for papal despotism. 37 As noted at the outset,
two major schools have traditionally held sway, one maintaining that
individual rights originated in the seventeenth century, the other
that individual rights first emerged in the fourteenth.
More recently it has been argued that the Roman lawyers of
the twelfth century developed the first modern rights theory, but
that this theory centered around passive rights. Canon law subse-
quently adopted this system of passive rights. According to this
school, it required the development of the distinction between dom-
inium directum and dominium utile38 to develop an active and posses-
sory theory of rights.
This section reviews the main lines of these historiographical
controversies. It attempts to make clear the presuppositions that
have shaped and conditioned the conclusions traditionally asserted
ing articles by Noel Didier are also invaluable to an understanding of the life and career of
Hostiensis. See Noel Didier, Henri de Suse en Angleterre (12367-1244), in 2 STUDI IN ONORE DI
VINCENZO ARANGIO-Rutz 333 (1953); Noel Didier, Henri de Suse, itilque Sr Sisteron (1244-
1250), 31 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS ET STRANGER 244, 409 (4th series, 1953):
Noel Didier, Henri de Suse, prieur d'Aritibes, prey& de Grasse (1235?-1245), 2 STUDIA GRATIANA
595 (1954).
H See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37 See R.W. CARLYLE & A.J. CARLYLE, 5 A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY
318-38 (1928).
38 See infra note 93 for a discussion of the distinction between dominium directum and
dominium utile.
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regarding the origins of the western rights tradition. In fact, ar-
guments that the western rights tradition originated in either the
seventeenth or the fourteenth centuries rest on flawed presuppo-
sitions. Those who argue for a seventeenth century origin tend
either to rely upon a faulty connection between seventeenth century
economic developments and rights discourse or to utilize historical
sources in an overly selective fashion. Those who argue for a four-
teenth century origin, on the other hand, have not considered the
possible influence of canon law on fourteenth century philosophical
disputes. This section argues that canon law in the thirteenth cen-
tury clearly distinguished between active and passive rights and that
important elements of thirteenth century canon law were "posses-
sory" in character.
A. Seventeenth Century Origins
It is taken as almost commonplace by some scholars that the
western rights tradition originated in seventeenth century England.
Two sharply contrasting schools of thought, one associated with
C.B. MacPherson, the other with Leo Strauss, make the case that
seventeenth century England gave birth to individual rights.
MacPherson argued that the emergence of rights was predicated
upon seventeenth century economic developments, while Strauss
asserted that concern for individual rights first arose with the aban-
donment of the central tenets of prior philosophical tradition. Both
of these approaches are flawed.
1. C.B. MacPherson
C.B. MacPherson began his book, The Political Theory of Posses-
sive Individualism, with the bold assertion that the seventeenth cen-
tury witnessed the "emergence of a new belief in the value and
rights of the individual."39 This belief found its expression in the
natural rights philosophers of the seventeenth century. MacPherson
set for himself the task of explaining why Thomas Hobbes and the
other natural rights thinkers of the time, such as the Leveller po-
lemicists and John Locke, should root their political philosophies in
a theory of individual rights. The explanation MacPherson offered
is that the natural rights philosophers were really projecting their
view of contemporary economic relations onto a hypothetical state
39 CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE 1 (1962).
	 •
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of nature and then deriving political philosophies congruent with
their class interests. 4°
There is no need to explore the intricate readings that Mac-
Pherson attempted of Hobbes, Locke and the other natural rights
thinkers. Rather, this article is.concerned with the presumptions of
MacPherson's historiography. How did he come to believe that
Hobbes was the first rights theorist? It appears that MacPherson
simply assumed the correctness of the traditional Marxist historiog-
raphy of rights. This assumption is most clearly evident in Mac-
Pherson's attempt to connect seventeenth century rights theories to
the economic conditions of the seventeenth century. To accomplish
this task, MacPherson postulated three basic economic models that
he acknowledges are "not sufficient or appropriate for general so-
ciological or historical analysis."'" Two of these models are impor-
tant for MacPherson's analysis: the customary or status society and
the possessive market society. 42
The customary or status society, in MacPherson's estimation,
typified feudal society. Productive work in the customary society
was allocated authoritatively to particular groups or classes. Each
group or class was confined to a particular type of work. Uncon-
ditional private property in land did not exist and, because of a
variety of conditions imposed on the individual use of land, there
was no meaningful market in real property. Finally, the labor force
was tied to the land, or at least to the performance of allotted
functions on the land.°
MacPherson contrasted this customary model with that of a
"possessive market society." Such a society lacks an authoritative
allocation of work. Contracts are authoritatively defined and en-
forced, individuals can alienate their own capacity to labor and are
permitted to maximize their own utility. Further, land is freely
alienable. Some individuals will have or want more material goods
and will employ the labor of others to maximize their holdings or
desires." MacPherson argued that England in the seventeenth cen-
tury closely approximated this possessive model and that the natural
rights philosophers were sensitive to these new economic conditions.
" See id. at 37-40,78-81.
4 ' Id. at 47.
49 See id. at.46-70. MacPherson introduced the third economic model, the simple market
society, only for the sake of comparison; MacPherson did not claim that it represents any
society that has actually existed.
41 Id. at 51-53.
44 Id. at 53-61.
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Their political philosophies were taken to be projections of their
class interests within a competitive, market economy. 45
In advancing these arguments, MacPherson adopted an essen-
tially Marxist historiography of rights. Marx understood feudal
society to be economically tightly restrained. Economic competition
was restricted by all sorts of traditional relationships. For example,
serfs could not sell their labor, lords could not alienate their land,
and guilds limited freedom of trade. These restraints were dissolved
in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Egoistic
man was now unconstrained and competitive. Rights, in this view,
were the creation of egoistic man seeking to universalize and justify
his own atomized existence."
This historiography can be criticized on a number of grounds.
England in the seventeenth century was not the "possessive market
society" MacPherson assumed it was. 47 Furthermore, many of the
"new economic attitudes" that Marx and MacPherson took as six-
teenth and seventeenth century novelties actually originated in the
high and late middle ages." These criticisms, however, simply dis-
turb the connection between seventeenth century economic condi-
tions and seventeenth century rights theories. The most damaging
objection is that already in the thirteenth century one can find a
systematic theory of rights. 49
2. Leo Strauss
A philosopher, Leo Strauss saw his vocation as the careful study
and exposition of the leading philosophers of ancient Greece and
45 Id. at 62-68.
46 See NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN
121-35 (,Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) for a brief explanation of Karl Marx's approach to
rights. The chief source for Marx's criticism of rights is his essay On the Jewish Question. For
an abridged translation of this essay, see id. at 137-50.
47 See IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 69-72 (1986).
Shapiro recognizes that arguments from economic models are "simplistic" and "historically
inaccurate." Id. at 69. Nevertheless, Shapiro does not reconsider his starting point. Like
MacPherson, Shapiro believes that the western rights tradition begins in the seventeenth
century. At the outset of his study, Shapiro declares that he begins with Thomas Hobbes's
work because it represents the "earliest recognizably modern" form of rights. Id. at 23.
46 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1954); John F. Mc-
Govern, The Rise of New Economic Attitudes—Economic Humanism, Economic Nationtaism—During
the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance A.D. 1200-1500, 26 TRADITIO 217 (1970). See Ems
ORIGO, THE MERCHANT OF PRATO: FRANCESCO EH MARCO DATINI {1957) for an example of a
late medieval "egoistic capitalist."
40 The irony, of course, is that many of the groups and relationships that Marx thought
to be so restrictive of rights—guilds and corporations, for example—were actually among
those forces which helped to shape thinking in rfVus.
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Rome. He constructed his historiography of rights out of his read-
ing of these philosophical texts and his own powerful logic. Strauss's
historiography rests on a fundamental distinction between classic
natural right and modern natural rights. Strauss identified three
types of classic natural right teachings, the first associated with Plato
and Socrates, the second with Aristotle and the third with Thomas
Aquinas. All three schools shared several common features. First,
all three were grounded on an objective and knowable right order.
All three schools of thought also emphasized duty; one was expected
to know and perform one's responsibilities, not claim one's rights.
Finally, Strauss argued that these schools held that reason unaided
by divine revelation was essential for discerning truth."
Strauss believed that this harmonious philosophical order was
destroyed in the seventeenth century. The particular engine of
destruction, in Strauss's opinion, was the philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes. Hobbes dismissed teleology as impossible in his universe.
He viewed the world in material terms as devoid of purpose. Hu-
man existence, at bottom, was asocial and apolitical. The war of all
against all was the fundamental rule of human nature. 5 '
It was in this context that Strauss witnessed a shift from duties
to rights. In the continual conflict of human relations one right is
paramount: the right to self-preservation. Self-preservation be-
comes the fundamental norm and all duties are derived from this
right.52
From the viewpoint of historiography, Strauss can be criticized
for his selection of sources. He wished to construct a grand theory
of the history of rights from the works of a few dozen philosophers.
In the process, Strauss ignored legal texts entirely. Contrary to
Strauss's presuppositions, a term like jus naturale was already de-
fined by canonists in the 1180s as a "zone of autonomy" or a "neutral
sphere of personal choice."55 Other rights, such as the right to self-
defense and the right of the poor to sustenance (aspects of a larger
right of self-preservation), were given legal recognition by the mid-
thirteenth century.54 There is no sharp break occurring in the sev-
5° See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 120-69 (1950). For this final reason,
Strauss ultimately questioned whether Thomism has a valid claim to teach classic natural
right.
51 See id. at 165-202.
52 See id.
'5 Brian Tierney, Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 1150-1250, 10
Misr. POL. THOUGHT 615, 635-37 (1989).
See BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 1.20.1 s.v. suscepit for a discussion of the
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enteenth century, at least in legal texts, between the linguistic use
of duties and of rights. Legal debates typically were framed in terms
of rights from the end of the twelfth century onward. 55
Thus, one can conclude that the case for a seventeenth century
origin of the western rights tradition rests on certain questionable
presuppositions made by the chief advocates of this position. C.B.
MacPherson, following Marx, argued that changing economic con-
ditions in the seventeenth century facilitated the growth of rights
theories. Leo Strauss, confining himself to a select group of philo-
sophical texts, maintained that a changed philosophical climate led
to a shift from duties to rights. In making these assertions, however,
neither scholar advanced conclusive arguments against an earlier
origin for the western rights tradition. Rather, their prior assump-
tions prevented them from exploring other sources.
B. Fourteenth Century Origins
Michel Villey wrote on the history of rights for nearly forty
years. Over that time he produced a powerfully argued synthesis
with two major components. First, the western legal tradition prior
to the fourteenth century (Villey meant Roman law primarily, but
canon law was included by implication) lacked an explicit, systematic
theory of rights. Second, such a theory was possible only with the
introduction of William of Ockham's theories of voluntarism and
nominalism. 55 Villey's arguments have attracted wide support. Both
elements of this synthesis shall be reviewed here.
1. Roman Law and Rights
Michel Villey argued that Roman law lacked an explicit rights
vocabulary in a series of four articles published in the 1940s and
I950s.57 In his early work, Villey's chief targets were the Romanists
of the early modern period. These scholars reorganized Roman law
on individualist premises. The seventeenth century Romanist Ger-
right of self defense. On the right of the poor to sustenance, see COUVREUR, LES PAUVRES
ONT-ILS DES DROITS? 100-19 (1961); BRIAN TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF
CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 38,126-27 (1959).
33 See Tierney, supra note 53, at 626-38.
" See Brian Tierney, Wiley, Oelcham and the Origin of Individual Rights, in WEIGHTIER
MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION 1, 2 n.5 ( J. Witte, Jr., & F.S. Alexander
eds., 1988).
37 Villey's seminal article is Michel Villey, L'idfe du droll subjectif et les systernes juridiques,
24 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS ET STRANGER 201 (1996). See Tierney, supra note
56, for a helpful critical review of some of Villey's arguments.
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hard Feltmann, for example, arranged his handbook of Roman law
on the basis of rights: jura in persona (rights in persons),jura in rebus
(rights in things) and jura ad res (rights to things). 58 But, Villey
noted, such an organization is foreign to Roman law. Villey dem-
onstrated that classical Roman law actually was organized on very
different premises. 59
Villey took as his starting point Gaius's Institutes. A didactic
work, the Institutes was meant to explain the basic elements of Ro-
man law, not advance a particular viewpoint. Written in the mid-
second century, the text is sufficiently close to classical sources to
reflect their outlook. What Villey found remarkable about the In-
stitutes is the absence of any developed notion of subjective right.
Unlike the early modern treatises, the Institutes is organized around
persons, things and actions, not rights. /us, which preeminently
meant a right to the early modern lawyers, was never defined as a
right by Gaius. 6°
Villey was not satisfied, however, with remaining at the level of
general organization or definition. He was aware that jus was some-
times used by Gaius in ways that would suggest to a modern reader
some concern with individual rights. For example, the jus utendi
fruendi, the jus of enjoyment and use, or the jus altius tollendi, the
jus of building higher, would seem to refer to a right of usufruct
or the right to build higher. Villey, however, argued that to translate
these jura as rights would be inappropriate. Villey illustrated how
inappropriate such a translation would be by looking at the jus altius
tollendi. This phrase is followed by the phrase aut non extollendi, the
jus of not building higher. Gaius could not have meant a "right" of
not building higher. He must have meant something else altogether
when he employed the term jus in this context. 61
Villey proposed a different way of viewing these jura. They are
not individual rights but incorporeal things. The Roman jurists
distinguished between res corporales, physical objects which might be
touched, and res incorporates, which are pure abstractions. A partic-
ular jus will accompany a particular res corporalis. The jus that ac-
companies a given piece of property is simply the aggregate of the
legal advantages and disadvantages inherent in the property. It is
Villey, supra note 57, at 202.
69 Id, at 209.
6° Id. at 204-06.
°' Id. at 216-17.
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an objectively existing abstract thing, not a power inhering in the
owner.62
Villey went on to make the case that jus understood as a res
incorporalis is radically different from jus understood as a right.
Villey was fond of defining a right as a power exercisable by the
individual." A right can never be a res incorporalis in Villey's view. 64
Gaius is concerned with jura that are incorporeal things, not rights.
In this early work, at least, Villey was not dogmatic in insisting
that subjective rights were impossible in Roman law. He acknowl-
edged that situations existed in ancient Rome where subjective
rights were at least implicit. He also acknowledged that certain legal
institutions, such as usufruct, came close to being subjective rights
even in classical Roman law. 65 Villey's point is the narrow one that,
if subjective rights were articulated at all in classical Roman law,
such rights formed a vague and quite subordinate concept. Roman
law was organized along different principles."
Villey developed these arguments in two subsequent articles on
the expression jus in re. 67 These articles are marked by a willingness
to acknowledge that an explicit notion of subjective rights came to
be articulated by the Roman lawyers of the late empire, and even
more so by the medieval glossators. Villey even appended to one of
his articles a list of definitions culled from late imperial and medi-
eval sources that suggests that jus was often understood as a subjec-
tive right."
62 Id. at 210-11, 212-15.
63 Id. at 214. Villey offered a definition of subjective right that remained largely un-
changed through his subsequent work: "J'emploierai A dessein, darts toutes cette discussion,
le mot droit subjectif: pouvoir appartenant, scion ['analyse moderne, S un sujet actif contre
sujets passifs." Id. at 214 n.1,
64 Id. at 214. "Quant A nous ne pensons pas que des choses (res) fussent-elles incorpo-
relies, puissent titre du droits subjectifs, res derniers &ant pouvoirs de I'homme sur les res."
Id.
66 Id. at 218.
66 Id. at 221. Villey described the idea of subjective rights in classical Roman law as
"vague, informe, indifferenciëe, exprim& par un vocabulaire pauvre et imprecis." Id.
The expression jus in re was not a common one in classical Roman law. Where used
at all it signified a res incorporalis, not a right. Expressions like suum jus, in classical texts,
meant the entire complex of advantages and disadvantages that an individual possesses. It is
everything that makes up his juridic situation. See Michel Villey, Du sens de ('expression jus in
re en droit roman classique, 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE5 DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITE (Mélanges
Fernand de Visscher II) 417, 424-27 (1949); Michel Villey, Le jus in re du droll romain classique
an drat moderne, in CONFERENCES FAITES A L'INSTITUT DE DROIT ROMAIN EN 1947, 193-95
(1950) (hereinafter Le jus in re].
68 See Le jus in re, supra note 67, at 209-25.
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In Villey's final article on Roman law, "Suum jus Cuique Tri-
buens,"69 both a new thesis and a new intransigence are evident.
Villey argued that the expression "to give to each his jus" did not
mean, as a modern would be tempted to read it, "give to each his
right." Villey, however, was no longer content to rest his argument
solely on the distinction between res incorporates and rights; he in-
troduced a philosophical explanation for his assertion. Plato, Aris-
totle and the Stoics all held that an objectively just social order is
knowable and achievable. These classical philosophies, especially
Stoicism, shaped the thinking of the Roman lawyers. When Roman
lawyers employed the term suum jus cuique tribuens, they meant that
each person should receive a just division of goods in an objectively
just social order. According to Villey, subjective rights were not even
possible until late medieval and early modern philosophers moved
jurisprudence away from these Aristotelian and Stoic foundations."
Regarding Villey's treatment of Roman law, a number of crit-
icisms might be made. It is possible that the Roman lawyers em-
ployed a word other than jus to signify a subjective right. 7 ' It is also
possible that Villey selected his sources too narrowly. He frequently
employed classical and early post-classical texts like Gaius, but a
study of later Roman texts would reveal a different state of affairs. 72
Finally, Villey's sharp distinction between jus as a res incorporalis and
jus as a right was not alWays observed, even in Gaius. 73
To Villey, as noted, jus understood as a res incorporalis is an
aggregate of legal advantages and disadvantages adhering to a given
physical object. A particular piece of land, for example, could have
attached to it a whole variety ofjura. As the example of the jus altius
non extollendi demonstrates, the landowner might not necessarily be
advantaged by the possession of these jura.
" Michel Villey, Suum jus Guique Tribuens, 2 STUDI IN ONORE DI PIETRO DE FRANCISCt
261 (1956).
7° Id.
71 See Giovanni Pugliese, Res corporales, res incorporales e it probletna del diritto soggettivo, 3
STUD! IN ONOILE DI VINCENZO ARANGIO-RUIZ 223 (1954).
72 See ERNST LEVY, WEST ROMAN VULGAR LAW: THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1951). Levy
provides a number of examples from late imperial Roman law suggesting that jus had come
to signify a right.
" According to Brian Tierney:
[Elven in Gaius himself, the concepts of potestas, &minium, and jus all seem to
be interwoven in a passage like this: slaves are in the power (potestate) of their
masters (daminorum) .. • if the cruelty of their masters seems intolerable they
are to be compelled to sell their slaves . . . for we ought not to use our right
(jure) badly.
See Tierney, supra note 56, at 5.
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By the thirteenth century, however, a jus, while continuing to
be termed a res incorporalis, ceased to be associated with particular
tangible objects. Rather, Jura at this point were typically conceived
of as powers or claims possessed by individuals, or juridic entities
like corporations. 74 Thus, for example, the jus conjugate, which is
discussed more fully below, was conceived of as an enforceable claim
by one marital partner upon the other: 75 Similarly, the jus eligendi,
the right to vote, became conceptualized as a power belonging to
individual electors. 76 /us was transformed unequivocally into an
individual power or claim; it signified an individual's legal advan-
tage, not the advantages and disadvantages inhering in a tangible
object.
By the thirteenth century this shift in the meaning of jus was
complete. Whether this was the product of twelfth century canon-
istic theorizing, the work of the medieval Roman glossators or the
accomplishment of the Roman lawyers of the late antique world"
is another question altogether. It is clear that this "new" meaning
of the word jus became an integral feature of the decretalist rights
analysis.
2. Ockham and Rights
In the 1950s, Villey shifted his research from a close study of
legal texts to a study of the philosophy of law. Once again, Villey's
research was prompted by his reading of early modern legal writers.
Grotius, Hobbes and others all saw jus chiefly as a facultas, or power
of the individual. Villey's concern was with identifying the moment
when this "monstrous infant" first flexed its limbs. Villey eventually
determined that the fourteenth century papal-Franciscan dispute
over property was that moment, and that William of Ockham, the
philosopher turned polemicist, was its inventor. 78
To Villey, Ockham represents a "copernican moment." Thomas
Aquinas had recently reconstructed the Aristotelian synthesis. To
74 The jus eligendi, for example, is conceptualized simultaneously as a power and as a
res incorporalis. See BERNARD Or PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS, X. 2.12.3 s.v. quasi-possessianent.
75 See infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
76 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
77 This shift in meaning remains unexplored historical territory. I hope to return to this
issue in a later study.
78 See Michel Villey, La genese du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d'Occam, 9 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIC DU DROIT 97 (1964), reprinted in MICHEL VILLEY, SEIZE ESSAYS DE PHILOSOPHIE
DU DROIT 140, 178 (1969) ("Nous nous sommes longuement attardes sur cette heure
de l'histoire du droit subjectif, on cet enfant monstreux semble sortir des limbes."). Villey's
view of subjective rights is an unrelievedly bleak one.
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Thomas, there was an objectively just order to the universe. Within
this framework of ordered justice everyone possessed, or ought to
possess, his or her just share. In a just world there would be no
clamor over egoistic interests and harmony would prevail. In Villey's
view, this synthesis was further supported by Thomas's proposed
metaphysics, consisting of elements of both universality and singu-
larity. Again, what one sees is harmony."
According to Villey, Ockham shattered this order in two ways.
He did so by emphasizing both voluntarism and nominalism in his
philosophy. As a voluntarist, Ockham stressed power as the guiding
element of creation, not an objectively knowable just order. At the
highest level, God Himself possesses an absolute subjective right,
the diving potestas. That is, God can do anything He wishes. This
conception of power is reflected in the social order. In the Thomistic
system, legislation mirrored the naturally just order of the universe.
In Ockham's, legislation was the product of power, the subjective
right of the legislator. To Thomas, jurists were "priests of justice."
To Ockham, they were simply servants of individual interests."
The second element to Ockham's thought that, in Villey's view,
contributed to the formation of the western rights tradition was
nominalism. Only the individual had real existence; hence, the only
logical starting point for legal development was the individual per-
son. Thus, the protection and advancement of individual claims and
powers, not an objectively just distribution of goods, became the
starting point of legal development.'
In conclusion, two points should be made about Villey's histo-
riography. First, Villey recognized in his early work an independent
role for lawyers. Gaius, for example, was taken as an intellect on
his own terms. Villey's later work, however, was characterized by a
desire to subordinate legal scholarship to a given philosophical
school of thought. Where legal scholarship cannot conveniently be
19 Id. at 147-49,164-69, 170-78.
" Id. at 170-71.
81 M. at 126. Villey states:
Occam ne peut imaginer, a partir du nominalism, qu'un art tendu non vers la
recherche dune harmonie dans la cite prise comme fin en soi, mais seulement
vers le service des individus, oriente vers l'utilite particuliere, ce qui presage
I'utilitarisme de la pens& juridique moderne, mais revient a denier au droit
toute frontiere precise. Le but recherche parait etre d'assurer a l'individu les
conditions d'une vie fibre et pleinement individuelle ; bien que cela nous semble
le contraire de l'office du droit, de lui garantir autant que possible les libertes
et les pouvoirs auxquels il aspire.
Id.
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labeled as "stoic" or "Thomist" or "nominalist" it is dismissed as
"disordered" or "vulgar." 82
This approach ignores the professional boundaries between law
and philosophy that existed in the middle ages. Lawyers and phi-
losophers received distinctly different educations. 85 Their profes-
sional interests differed as well. Canon lawyers tended to be men
of affairs as well as academicians; they were chiefly concerned with
the practical problems of ecclesiastical order and governance. A
philosopher or logician like Ockham, until he was drawn into po-
lemics, would not have shared these interests. Finally, canon lawyers
worked from a different set of sources. They did not expound upon
Thomas's Summa, but rather plumbed the depths of Gratian's De-
crelum or Gregory IX's Liber Extra. 84 There is no reason to believe
that the canon lawyers were incapable of inventing their own con-
ceptual framework without some learned philosopher taking them
by the hand.
In fact, thirteenth century decretalist commentaries reveal that
a consistent conceptual framework was already in place. This frame-
work included a large role for individual rights. It must be kept in
mind, however, that much of this framework only existed in a half-
articulated form. The decretalists never wrote a treatise on rights.
Nevertheless, a concern for rights percolated through their treat-
ments of a variety of legal institutions. The absence of a treatise on
individual rights might be explained by the decretalists' own sense
of practicality; they might not have seen it as serving any useful
purpose. But one should not mistake the absence of theoretical
speculation for the lack of a consistently deployed concept.
Second, Villey assumes that philosophical systems that postulate
the existence of a higher order principle are essentially incompatible
with individual rights. Such an assumption is fundamentally flawed.
For example, the commandment to honor one's mother and father
is a statement of a higher order principle. This statement may be
cast in terms of a duty; that is, children must honor their parents.
It may also be recast in terms of a right; parents have the right to
be honored by their children. This point is important for under-
82 See, e.g., Michel Villey, Les origins de la notion de droit subjectif, 2 ARCHIVES DE PHILOS-
opme DU DROIT 103 (1953), reprinted in LEGONS D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 271
n.52 (1957). In this article, Villey refers to Henry de Bracton as writing in a vulgar language.
"' See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 346-48 for a helpful quick review of the emergence
of canon law as a distinct discipline.
84 On the relationship of philosophy and law as well as their professional boundaries,
see LEBRAS, supra note 21, at 23-45.
58	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:37
standing the canonists. The canonists had a clear conception of
right order. For example, they believed that marriage has a certain
"natural" structure to it. At the same time, however, they under-
stood that marriage gives rise to rights."
C. Richard Tuck
Recently, Richard Tuck has written an important book about
individual rights theories in the early modern period. 86 In his open-
ing two chapters he purports to trace the origin of these natural
rights theories to medieval sources, 87 These chapters already have
been criticized for their inconsistent terminology and chronology. 88
Two additional observations need to be made.
First, Tuck proposes that the Romanists of the twelfth century
developed the "first modern rights theory." This was a theory "built
round the notion of a passive right."89 Tuck subsequently asserts
that this "passive rights theory" characterized medieval canon law."
In employing a distinction between active and passive rights
Tuck borrows from the language of analytical philosophy. When
David Lyons, upon whom Tuck relies, employed these terms, he
meant that an active right is the right to do something. A passive
right, in contrast, is the right to receive something from someone
else.9 ' The canonists, however, knew perfectly well how to distin-
guish between an active right and a passive right. Bernard of Parma,
for example, distinguished between the jus eligendi active, the active
right to cast a ballot, and the jus eligendi passive, the passive right of
being elected.92 Voting is the act of doing something, while being
elected is the receipt of something, namely an office. Bernard's
85 Modern examples of philosophical systems that derive rights from preexistent prin-
ciples of right order include JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980);
JACQUES MARITAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL
LAW (Doris C. Anson trans., 1986).
" RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
(1979).
87
 Id. at 5-31.
" See Brian Tierney, Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems, 4 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 429,
431-44 (1983).
" TUCK, supra note 86, at 13.
" Id. at 15.
81 David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 Nous 45 (1970).
qt
	 OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 1.6.41 S.V. ipsius: "Sed quare dicitur hic, quod
metropolitanus eliget de eadem ecclesia cum ipsi perdiderunt jus eligendi? Responsum, ipsi
perdiderunt jus eligendi active, i.e., quia ipsi non possunt eligere; secl non passive, quia bone
possunt eligi."
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terms fit Lyons's categories unambiguously. Tuck's thesis that canon
law knew only passive rights is simply untenable in the light of this
evidence.
Secondly, Tuck argues that the distinction made by the mid-
thirteenth century Romanists between dominium directum and domi-
nium utile was crucial to the evolution of a possessive theory of
rights." It seems, however, that this distinction is unimportant for
the development of rights theories. A rights theory already was
well-established in canon law by the mid-thirteenth century, and the
invention of dominium utile appears to have had no discernible effect
upon it. Rights in canon law definitely had a certain possessive
character." This character, however, is most likely derived from the
shift in the meaning of jus and res incorporalis discussed above. fus
was in canon law both a res incorporalis and a power or claim be-
longing to the individual. This shift, however, predates the Roman-
ist distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile and is
independent of it. 95
III. RIGHTS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW
A. The Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights
Alan Gewirth has asserted that every society, at least implicitly,
has some set of subjective rights. 96 The point here, however, is not
that canon law had a set of subjective rights implicit within its legal
structure. Rather, the contention is that the decretalists possessed a
well-developed explicit understanding of subjective rights. To make
this case it is necessary to examine the decretalist rights vocabulary.
95 TUCK, supra note 86, at 15-17. Dominium, or dominium directum, was understood as full
ownership rights in property, while dominium utile was a subordinate interest such as usufruct.
Tuck argues that in the thirteenth century dominium utile came to be understood as a right
defensible against third party interference and freely alienable or transferable. Tuck makes
much of this development. He asserts that from this time forward rights came to be seen
peculiarly as a person's property. Canonistic rights theories, however, developed quite in-
dependently of this distinction.
94 Because rights were conceptualized as res incorporates, they were intangible things that
were possessed by individuals. It was this dual character of rights that in all likelihood gave
the western rights tradition its possessive nature.
95 The right to vote provides a helpful example of the conflation that took place between
the notions of jus as faculty or power and jus as res incorporalis. The right to vote was often
termed a liberty, see X 3.9.3, a faculty, see X 1.6.31 or a power, see X 1.6.52. At the same
time, the decretalists also conceptualized the right to vote as a res incorporalis and therefore
a possession, or quasi possession, of the individual. See, e.g., BERNARD OF Nam*, X 2.12.3
s.v. quasi-possessions.
96 ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 98-101 (1978).
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A helpful starting point in this examination might be our own
rights vocabulary here in the late twentieth century United States.
It is an exceedingly rich vocabulary. Claim, power, privilege, im-
munity, liberty, authorization, interest and prerogative can all be
understood to be equivalent to the word "right" depending on the
context. How might we begin to sort our way through this vocab-
ulary? Our understanding of individual rights has been aided im-
measurably by the attention analytical philosophers have given this
term. Wesley Hohfeld was one such philosopher.97
Hohfeld wrote with the avowed purpose of identifying and
distinguishing the cluster of meanings that had congregated around
the terms "right" and "duty. "98
 He found especially regrettable the
efforts of his colleagues and predecessors to reduce all jural rela-
tionships to rights and duties. Displeased with these attempts, Hoh-
feld identified a series of eight fundamental legal relations: four
'jural opposites" and four "jural correlatives."99
Hohfeld's attempt to reform the rights vocabulary ultimately
did not prevail. Nevertheless, his work remains an enormously use-
ful analytical device for understanding the meanings that attach to
the terms "right" and "duty" in ordinary legal writing. In this sec-
tion, Hohfeld's jural correlatives will be applied to the decretalist
rights vocabulary. First, however, Hohfeld's understanding of the
jural correlatives will be summarized.
1. Rights and Duties
Hohfeld began his analysis with the relationship of rights and
duties. Hohfeld assumed that all those who use the term right, even
in its broadest sense, mean to have it correlate with the term duty.
Thus, Hohfeld concluded that rights in their strict sense must cor-
relate with duties, because apparently this is the meaning that would
command universal assent. He further concluded that "claim rights"
constitute the one class of rights that correlates with duties)°°
Hohfeld provided an example to illustrate what he meant by
claim right. Property owner X has a right—or, equivalently, a
claim—against Y that Y stay off X's land. The correlative expression
97 See WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (W.W. Cook ed., 1923).
9e Id. at 35-36.
" Id. at 36. For additional background on Hohfeld's project, see Joseph William Singer,
The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev.
975.
See HOHEELD, supra note 97, at 36-38.
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is that Y has a duty to stay off X's property."' It is through this
correlation alone that, in Hohfeld's estimation, a right is properly
understood. "2
2. Privileges and No-Rights
Hohfeld next identified privileges as a conceptual category dis-
tinct from rights. Privileges correlate with "no-rights." Hohfeld il-
lustrated the operation of this correlation by utilizing a variation on
the example concerning claim rights. Property owner X has the
privilege of entering his property and, equivalently, has no duty not
to enter the property. Correlatively, Y has "no-right" that X shall
not enter."'"
Hohfeld gave a second example, perhaps sensing that his as-
sertion that privilege should be understood as conceptually distinct
from claim was in need of further justification. Quoting John Chip-
man Gray, Hohfeld stated:
The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine and, if
I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is
therefore aright of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have
paid for, although I know that shrimp salad always gives
me colic.'"
Hohfeld identified two distinct sets of relations in this example.
First, the speaker has a privilege to eat the salad and A, B, C and D
have no right that the speaker not eat the salad. Second, the speaker
has claims against A, B, C and D that they not interfere with the
eating of the salad and, correlatively, A, B, C and D have a duty not
to disrupt the speaker's eating of the salad. 105 -But these two concepts
are separable; A, B, C and D might be the owners of the salad and
might have told the speaker to "eat the salad if you can, but we
don't agree not to interfere with you.'! In this case, the speaker
would have the privilege of eating the salad but would lack a claim
against A, B, C and D not to interfere. 106
Hohfeld also attempted to fit the notion of legal liberty within
his understanding of privilege. By legal liberty Hohfeld apparently
mi Id. at 38.
1°2 Id.
Id. at 38-50.
104 Id. at 41.
1 °3 Id.
106
 Id. at 42.
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meant a legally protected range of personal choice. Thus, Hohfeld
cited as an example of liberty the "freedom . . . to fire off a gun."° 7
Hohfeld's effort to fit legal liberties within the concept of priv-
ilege is probably the most unsatisfying part of his analysis. As Hoh-
feld's own example, the firing of a gun, would suggest, he has
collapsed together the two ideas he distinguished in his treatment
of John Chipman Gray's hypothetical. The legal liberty to fire a gun
in fact includes both a privilege of firing or not firing the gun and
a claim against others who would prohibit or require the firing.' 08
While this is a paper on legal history and not a philosophical
analysis of Hohfeldian categories, it would be permissible to add at
this point, following Carl Wellman, that most rights seem to be
clusters of Hohfeldian elements.m Thus, for example, as noted
below,"° the jus eligendi can be seen either as a privilege, or a power,
depending on the perspective adopted.
3. Powers and Liabilities
In explaining powers, Hohfeld distinguishes between two
means by which a given legal relation might be changed. A legal
relation might be changed by "some superadded fact or group of
facts not under the volitional control of a human being" or "from
some superadded fact or group of facts which are under the voli-
tional control of one or more human beings."'" Hohfeld denomi-
nated the latter situation a legal power. Hohfeld adduced a number
of examples of legal powers. One such is that a person might
extinguish his or her legal interest in a given piece of property by
abandoning it or by selling it. Similarly, agents might possess certain
legal powers by which to bind their principals, and public officials
hn See HOHFELD, supra note 97, at 42-43.
LOS Judith Jarvis Thomson, in developing this point, has persuasively argued that legal
liberties are much stronger than Hohfeld's notion of legal privilege. In Thomson's estimation,
most legal liberties carry claims against others not to interfere in their exercise "in a certain
range of ways." See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 53-55 (1990). In line
with Thomson's criticism it must be noted that, taken alone, not all of Hohfeld's categories
can be termed "rights." It is probably safer to see rights, as Carl Wellman does, as clusters
of Hohfeldian categories. See A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAWS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND MORALS (1985). Depending on the precise analysis chosen, the claim aspect of a right
might be prominent or its aspect as a privilege or immunity, or power.
' 09 Ste CARL WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
MORALS (1985).
II° See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
HOHFELD, supra note 97, at 50-51.
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might possess powers by which to carry out the responsibilities of
office." 2
Hohfeld illustrated the correlation between powers and liabil-
ities with an example drawn from contracts law. "Suppose A mails
a letter to B offering to sell the former's land Whiteacre to the latter
for $10,000." These facts have created a legal power in B. By
responding affirmatively to A's offer, B changes his own and A's
legal relationship with respect to Whiteacre. Similarly, A is under a
liability to follow through on the offer should B respond favorably,
although only after B has actually accepted A's offer would a specific
duty be created.'"
4. Immunities and Disabilities
The final correlative Hohfeld examined is that between an
immunity and a disability. He defined immunity by comparing it to
the other terms discussed above. An immunity bears the same re-
lationship to a power as a privilege does to a right. "A right is one's
affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is one's freedom
from the right or claim of another."" 4 In the same way, "a power
is one's affirmative control over a given legal relation as against
another" while "an immunity is one's freedom from the legal power,
or control of another as regards some legal relation."" 5
Once again Hohfeld illustrated his point with an example.
Property owner X has the power to alienate the property to I' or to
other parties. At the same time, X has "various immunities as against
Y and all other ordinary parties.""s This is because "Y is under a
disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal interest
either to himself or to a third party . . . and what is true of Y applies
similarly to everyone else who has not" acquired a power to alienate
X's property." 7
Hohfeld noted that the concept of immunity possesses special
significance in the area of exemptions from the power of taxation."B
112 Id. at 52-53.
115 Id. at 55.
114 Id. at 60.
115 Id.
115 Id.
n' Id.
115
 Hohfeld does not draw the extension, but the concept of immunity seems equally
important in the case of other exemptions from governmental powers.
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This situation satisfies Hohfeld's definition neatly. The government
possesses the power to tax, but the individual, or other entity, is
free from that "power" or "control" in a given instance." 9
B.	 The Hohfeldian Analysis Applied to the Decretalist Rights
Vocabulary
The purpose underlying the inclusion of the foregoing discus-
sion is not to propose a philosophical defense of Hohfeld's approach
to rights. Rather, the point is that, assuming the essential accuracy
of Hohfeld's analysis, the canonistic rights vocabulary corresponds
closely to Hohfeld's categories. The canonistic rights vocabulary,
like our own, is a rich one. Libertas, polestar, facultas, immunitas,
dominium, justitia, interesse and actio can all, in the appropriate cir-
cumstances, be translated as "right." This article, however, focuses
its analysis on two terms, jus and facultas.
jus, as should be already evident, was a term capable of multiple
meanings. It might mean law in the sense of a particular statute or
even an entire legal system. fus also could mean, at least in classical
Roman law, a res incorporalis understood as an aggregate of advan-
tages and disadvantages inhering in a given physical object. It also
seems commonly agreed that early modern authors such as Hobbes
and Suarez frequently used the term to mean an individual right. 120
Facultas, as well, frequently could mean an individual right.
The meanings of jus and facultas overlapped to a substantial degree:
both terms could mean an individual right. When used to convey
the sense of individual right, jus was frequently defined as a facul-
tas.' 21 But facultas also had a range of meanings independent of jus.
It seems that the canonists frequently used this term to convey the
sense of Hohfeldian liberty or privilege. Thus, individuals possessed
a number of basic facultates: the faculties of renouncing a right, 122
of conducting a trial,'" of introducing evidence at trial,' 24 of re-
119 Id, at 61.
10 See for example, Tucx, supra note 86, at 54-55 for a discussion of Suarez and TUCK,
supra note 86, at 119-42 for a discussion of Hobbes.
1 * 1 Innocent 111, for example, described in the decretal Cum Eeelesia Vulterana the
individual right to vote held by cathedral chapter members as libera facultas, a free faculty.
See X 1.6.31.
in See, e.g., X 5.20.9.
1 " See, e.g., X 2.14.7 (the facultas of defending oneself at trial); X 3.9.1 (the facultas of
prosecuting one's right).
1" Hos-riErtsts, SUMMA, Bk. I, De conmetudine f 6.
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taming a proctor,' 25 and of making a vow. 126 One facultas, the faculty
of contracting marriage, is discussed in greater depth below.
This paper, however, first compares canonistic usages of the
term jus to Hohfeld's categories by looking briefly at the role played
by rights in particular legal structures such as canonistic poor law
and election law. The following discussion will establish that the
term jus fits the full range of Hohfeld's analysis of the concept
"right."
1. Rights and Duties
A number of examples may be adduced to illustrate the cor-
relation that existed in canon law between a right, understood
strictly, and a duty. One such example might be the bishop's cath-
edraticum. The cathedraticum was a fixed sum payable to the bishop
by the churches of a diocese. The cathedraticum formed one part of
the jus episcopate, the bishop's right. The bishop thus had a claim
upon the churches of his diocese corresponding exactly with the
churches' duty to make the payment. 127
A more complex, but perhaps more instructive, example of the
correlation of rights and duties can be found in canonistic poor law.
Early on, Christian authors recognized an obligation to the poor on
the part of Christians. The patristic tradition, for example, admon-
ished wealthy Christians to provide for the needs of the poor.' 28
This tradition of an obligation toward the poor was incorporated
in Gratian's Decretum.' 29 At least in 1140, however, the obligation of
wealthy Christians remained at the level of a general duty, without
corresponding rights on the part of the poor to claim sustenance.' 3°
An important move toward the creation of a right of the poor
to sustenance was suggested by Huguccio. Huguccio argued that,
while property might be held privately in ordinary times, superflu-
ous goods were to be shared with the poor in times of necessity.
Huguccio, however, did not connect this doctrine with a corre-
1" X 1.38.7.
1S Hosmrists, SUMMA, Bk. III, De voto § 15.
1" X 1.31.16. On the cathedraticum, see T.F. DONOVAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INSTITUTE OF THE CATHEDRATICUM: AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS (1964); M. Lalmont, Cathedra-
ileum, 2 DICTIONNAIRP, DE DROIT CANONIQUE 1436 (1937).
118 MICHEL MOLLAT, THE POOR IN THE MIDDLE AGM AN ESSAY IN SOCIAL HISTORY 20-
23 (1986); TIERNEY, supra note 54, at 9-12.
1!9 TIERNEY, supra note 54, at 9-12.
1!U
	 COUVREUR, supra note 54, at 80-81.
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sponding claim right that the poor might assert to superfluous
goods."'
Huguccio's successors responded to this gap by acknowledging
that the poor possessed such a claim right to the superfluous goods
of the wealthy. Around 1200, Alanus Anglicus argued that a poor
man was not stealing from the wealthy when he took their property
because he was really taking what was his by natural right. 19" An-
other commentator, an anonymous contemporary of Alanus, stated
that a poor man was entitled to take property on his own authority
and thus to declare a right for himself.'" Hostiensis represented
the furthest extension of this development when he asserted that a
person suffering from the necessity of hunger, rather than plotting
a theft, seemed to be using his right.' 34 Although the commentators
did not develop the point, this right clearly seems to correlate with
the duty, recognized by earlier authors, of the wealthy to provide
for the poor.
Some of Huguccio's immediate successors also attempted to
develop a judicial mechanism for processing the claims of the poor.
They asserted that an individual poor person might, by utilizing
the equitable doctrine known as evangelical denunciation, appear
before the bishop and assert a claim for sustenance. The bishop
then might compel a wealthy man to provide support for that
person, and could even use excommunication as a sanction for
noncompliance.'"
Unfortunately, this particular judicial sanction did not fare well
among the decretalists. Although Bernard of Parma continued to
support this particular remedy, Innocent IV sharply narrowed its
application.'" Hostiensis ultimately agreed with Innocent.'"
What is significant, however, is not whether a particular coer-
cive mechanism survived in the canon law but that a correlation
111 Id. at 100. Brian Tierney has recently documented the emergence of the natural
right of the poor to sustenance. See supra, note 53, at 641-43.
" Gloss ad comp. 15.26.5, quoted in COUVREUR, supra note 54, at 161 n.280 ("quod
accipit suum jure naturali efficitur").
'" Apparatus Militant siquidem ad comp, 1 5.26.5, quoted in COUVREUR, supra note 54,
118 n.349 ("Nota: potest abiici quod per judicem debet petere quia in tali articulo non potest
judicem exspectare, unde in tali articulo potest sibi jus dicere, sicut et creditor si videat
debitorem suum a civitate fugere, potest res ipsius auctoritate propria occupare.").
"4 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 5.18.3 s.v. netessitatem: "Uncle potius videtur is qui necessi-
tatem patitur uti jure quam furtum consilium inire."
"s See COUVREUR, supra note 54, at 108-15; TIERNEY, supra note 54, at 37-39.
1 " INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 3.17.1 s.v. admoneant (limiting the application of
excommunication to cases of scandal).
17 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 3.17.1 s.v. ;norm:1W.
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between rights and duties had been worked out by the canonists in
this basic area of law. Where earlier commentators had recognized
a vague and general duty that the wealthy owed the poor, the
canonists who followed Huguccio developed the concept into a
right. Hohfeld's categories are satisfied in this development.
2. Privileges and No-Rights
The operation of the jus eligendi, the right to vote, is a useful
illustration of the privilege/no-right correlation in medieval canon
law. The governance of a medieval diocese was a matter of shared
responsibilities.'" The bishop was recognized as the head of the
diocese and his authority was never formally called into question.
But the cathedral chapter, that body of clerics either resident at the
cathedral chapter or who derived economic support by virtue of
membership in the chapter, represented a powerful counterweight
to monolithic episcopal governance.' 39 One of the most cherished
privileges held by individual chapter members was the right to vote
for chapter officers, including, when the office became vacant, the
right to vote for bishop.
In many respects the jus eligendi operated as a Hohfeldian
privilege or liberty might operate. Individual chapter members were
free to renounce their right and thus decline to participate in a
particular election. If they chose to vote, the law granted them a
legally protected range of personal choice.
The decretalists attempted to secure the free exercise of the jus
eligendi in two separate ways. The decretalists first argued that any
coercion of the voting decisions of the electors was impermissible.
The election was invalid if coercion had been used to obtain a
particular result.' 4° Other rules were corollaries to this basic prin-
ciple. For example, members of a cathedral chapter who had been
treated contemptuously and excluded from an election subse-
quently could not be compelled to ratify the chapter's choice."'
Furthermore, voting had to be done secretly in order to preserve
138 See JEAN GAUDEMET, LE GouvERNEmENT DE L'EaLise A CEPOQUE CLASSIQUE, 11' PARTIE,
Lt GOUVERNEMENT LOCAL 104-215 (Gabriel LeBras and Jean Gaudemet eds. 1979).
1" Id. at 184-215; see also LAWRENCE G. DUGGAN, BISHOP AND CHAPTER: THE GOVER-
NANCE OF THE BISHOPRIC OF SPEYER TO 1552 (1978); KATHLEEN EDWARDS, ENGLISH SECULAR
CATHEDRALS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1949); ADAM VETULANI, LE GRAND CHAPITRE DES STRAS-
BOURG DES ORIGINES A LA FIN DU PIN DU Xin e saint (1927).
' 4° See, e.g., BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 1.6.23 S.L. metuebant.
141 Id. at X 1.6.28 s.u. consentire.
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the free consent of each individual canon. 142
 Finally, an election was
invalid where a just fear of violence existed at the time of the voting,
even if no violence actually took place. 143
The free choice that electors possessed was fortified in a second
way as well. Cum in cunctis, a decretal of Alexander III, established
the qualifications necessary for election to office. Alexander's rules
have a remarkably subjective quality. Election to the office of bishop
required that a candidate be at least thirty years of age and possess
a certain maturity, moral gravity and appropriate learning. 144 Can-
didates for other diocesan offices had to be at least twenty-five years
of age and possess suitable morals and learning.'"
Although the decretalists offered some guidance on minimum
standards of maturity, learning and morals, the range of discretion
left to individual electors was rather large.'" Electors were not
required to vote for the candidate judged best under some set of
objective criteria. Electors were accorded a sphere of autonomy
within which they could exercise independent judgment in assessing
the candidates' suitability for office.
Thus, it should be evident that the jus eligendi operated much
like a Hohfeldian privilege. Furthermore, it correlated with a set of
no-rights. Those outside the chapter, who lacked the jus eligendi,
could not participate in elections. This correlation was perhaps most
explicit in the case of laypersons, who had no right to participate
in ecclesiastical elections. Lay participation in an ecclesiastical elec-
tion would render the election void. 147 Innocent IV took what may
142 Id. at X 1.6.42 s.v. secrete. The decree Quia propter, issued by IV Lateran, was a
systematic attempt at electoral reform. Among other issues, the drafters of Quia proper were
concerned with how to balance the need for secrecy with the need to weigh ballots properly,
since elections were won by the side that was both major el sanior. In mid-thirteenth century
canon law, one would win an election if one received the votes of both the major—the larger—
and the savior—sounder—portion of the electing body. Those who occupied more prestigious
positions within the electing body were judged the "sounder" portion. So that ballots might
be properly weighted, the Council declared that a chapter should appoint three men to
enquire secretly and diligently into this matter. Lawrence of Somercote's treatise on election
law, published in 1254, suggests that Quia proper's requirements remained a lively part of
the law. See TRAKTATUS DES LAURENTIUS DE SOMERCOTE KANONIKUS VON CHICHESTER DRER
DIE VORNAHME VON BISCHOFSWAHLEN 40-41 (A. von Wretschko ed., 1907).
143
 INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 1.6.23 5.V. vi.
144
 X 1.6.7,
142 Id.
146
 See, e.g., X 1.6.17 (stating that those elected to the episcopacy must possess suitable
knowledge, conveniens scientia, for this position). Even so, Bernard of Parma noted suitable
knowledge need not be outstanding knowledge. See X 1.6.17 s.v. conveniens ("Bene dicit
conveniens, quia sufficit quod sit convenientis scientiae licet non eminentis.").
147 X 1.6.56.
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have been the most extreme view on this subject. By natural law,
Innocent argued, laypersons were incapable of holding jura spiri-
tualia—spiritual rights, or the category of rights that included the
jus eligendi. Hence, Innocent concluded, natural law demanded that
laypersons not have a right to participate in capitular, or chapter,
elections.'"
3. Powers and Liabilities
The operation of the jus eligendi, the canonistic right to vote,
also furnishes a clear example of the Hohfeldian correlative of
power and liability. Election by compromise, as the name suggests,
was usually utilized where the electing body was sharply divided. A
small group of electors, the compromissarii, would be designated by
the larger body. This smaller group was then empowered to elect
someone to fill the contested vacancy. The larger body was corre-
spondingly obliged to accept whomever the smaller group se-
lected. 149
This method of election closely corresponds to Hohfeld's cat-
egories of power and liability. The compromissarii were exercising a
power. They were changing their legal relationship with the other
electors by "some superadded fact or group of facts which are under
the volitional control of one or more human beings." The "super-
added fact or group of facts" is the mandate the compromissarii have
been given by the larger body. The legal change they work is the
filling of the vacancy. This power on the part of the compromissarii
correlates with a liability on the part of the electors to accept whom-
ever the compromissarii select.
A second example of this correlation at work can be found in
the operation of proctorial mandates. It is this area of law that gave
rise to modern agency theory.' 5° A particular individual, typically
called by the canoeists dominos or lord, would cede certain powers
to a proctor, who would then undertake to represent the lord, This
grant might be for a specific matter or it might be a more general
148 INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 1.6.28 s.v. in ecciesia ("Jura enim spiritualia in non
spirituales et non consecratas personas non omnino honeste cadunt et hoc statuere jus
naturale suadet.").
149 On election by compromise, see A. DESPRAIRIES, L'ELEcTioN DES EVEQUES PAR LES
CHAPITRES AU XII SIkCLE (THEORIE CONONIQUE) 25-29 (1922); ANSCAR PARSONS, CANONICAL
ELECTIONS: AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS AND COMMENTARY 61-62 (1939).
15° GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIC LAW AND THE STATE,
1100-1322, at 91-92 (1964).
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grant of authority. It was known typically as a grant of potestas or
plena potestas, power or full power. 15 '
This relationship first emerged in the judicial context. A person
unable to be physically present in court would empower a repre-
sentative to act for him. This theory's greatest impact, however, was
not felt in the courtroom but in the development of medieval po-
litical thought. By the end of the thirteenth century, for example,
the writ calling upon communities to send representatives to the
English Parliament would instruct the localities to grant the repre-
sentatives full power, plena potestas, to transact business in the com-
munities' name.' 52
The correlation between power and liability found in the law
on proctorial agency fits Hohfeld's own example. On the one hand,
there is a grant of power to certain agents to undertake certain acts
in the name of their lords—their principals. At the same time, the
principals are placed under a correlative liability to be bound by
their representatives' acts.
4. Immunities and Disabilities
The operation of the immunity/disability correlation might be
seen best by examining the complex legal position of monasteries
within a diocese. It is important to note that a monastery was an
independently governed entity under the direction of its abbot. A
monastery owned its own lands, conducted its own financial affairs
and maintained its own liturgical life.' 53
At the same time, however, a monastery was under the general
strict supervision of the diocesan bishop. The level of supervision
depended upon whether the monastery had received a grant of
exemption from episcopal authority. Exemptions could be issued
either by the diocesan bishop himself or the pope. The degree of
the monastery's exemption depended upon which person had
granted the exemption. By the mid-thirteenth century, a papal
grant of exemption was understood to remove fully a monastery
from episcopal jurisdiction. A bishop would not be able to conduct
visitations of the monastery nor collect fees from it. Rather, the
45 ' Id. at 91-162.
152
 Id. at 160-62.
163
 C.H. LAWRENCE, MEDIEVAL MONASTICISM: FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIPS IN WESTERN
EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 111-24 (1984).
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monastery was placed directly under papal jurisdiction in all re-
spects. 1 '
A bishop might grant an exemption to a monastery located
within his diocese, but there were limitations on the subject matter
covered by the exemption. The basic rule was established in Inno-
cent III's decretal Cum ohm: a bishop could not grant an exemption
that would result in enormous damage (enorme detrimentum) to the
diocese.' 55
 Determining the level of damage that would be consid-
ered enormous was a complex matter. A bishop could not entirely
alienate his jurisdictional powers, but he could, and quite often did,
grant exemptions to monasteries and their chapels from certain
obligatory tithes.' 56
The entire issue of exemption was put in terms of jus. Where
no exemption had been granted, a bishop might exercise his full
jus episcopate over a monastery or its chapels and churches. 157 A
bishop would lack jus over a monastery that was fully exempt. 158
Innocent IV even defined exemption as the loss of all rights in a
particular church. 159
Again, the canonistic structure satisfies Hohfeld's categories.
Monasteries might have either a full or partial immunity from
episcopal governance and taxation. This immunity correlates closely
with a full or partial disability on the part of episcopal authority.
The bishop was disabled from exercising certain jurisdictional pre-
rogatives or claiming certain fees from the monastery.
In sum, it has been maintained that the received historiography
of rights has taken no notice of canon law as a possible source for
the western rights tradition. This historiography, however, rests on
questionable presuppositions. The foregoing discussion has served
essentially as a refutation of this historiography. Canon law did
indeed possess the concept of an individual right. Further, individ-
ual rights in canon law were an explicit part of the legal system.
Like our own system, medieval canon law had a rich rights vocab-
154 Id. at 119-23; see also PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 154-86; CHRISTOPHER CHENEY,
EPISCOPAL VISITATION OF MONASTERIES IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 36-47 (1931).
155
 X 5.33.12.
15" PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 162-77.
157 The decretal Conquerente aeronomy of Honorius 111 included visitation among the
contents of the jus episcopate. See X 1.31.16.
155
 See, e.g., BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 5.33.12 S.V. dioecesani ("Et idea
nullum jus reservavit ipsi episcopo in monasterio ilto, ex quo verba plenae exemptionis
continebanatur in privilegio illy . . . .").
155
 See, e.g., INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 5.33.7 s.v. specialiter ("item nota quad si
ecclesia est exempts non solum perdit jus in ecclesia episcopus sed in clericis ecclesiae .
	 .").
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ulary. The term jus was selected for study because, historians have
maintained that it signifies an individual right in the works of later
writers such as Ockham and Hobbes. Various twelfth and thirteenth
century usages of the term jus correspond to all of the jural corre-
latives postulated by Hohfeld.
Additionally, it should be noted that the use of Hohfeld's cat-
egories is not meant to pigeonhole various canonistic rights into one
or another of these categories. A particular canonistic right can
often be made to fit two or more of Hohfeld's categories at the
same time, depending on the precise analysis one takes of the right
in question. For example, this can be seen in our discussion of the
right to vote. The jus eligendi has some of the aspects of a Hohfeldian
privilege but it also has some of the aspects of a Hohfeldian
power)"
Thus it is established that, contrary to the received historiog-
raphy, canon law possessed explicitly articulated individual rights.
But were these rights, to use Villey's language, a vague and subor-
dinate concept in medieval canon law? Or were areas of medieval
canon law organized around notions of individual rights? The law
of marriage will be examined to establish that in marriage law, at
least, individual rights played a fundamental role.
C. The Function of Rights in Canonistic Matrimonial Law
This section• explores in a more systematic way the operation
of rights in one area of canon law—the law of marriage. It will
demonstrate that individual rights played a fundamental role both
in the decretalist understanding of how a marriage came into being,
and how, once created, it was maintained. The freedom to contract
marriage was first recognized by Gratian and the decretists who
followed him. This right was expanded and strengthened by the
decretalists. Another right, fundamental to the maintenance of mar-
riage, was the right to demand, and the tightly correlating duty to
render, the conjugal debt. Both of these rights will be explored
below.
This article further contends that large areas of medieval canon
law in fact consisted of structures of rights. This contention will be
illustrated by showing that one central area of canonistic jurispru-
dence—the law of marriage—consisted of a structure of rights. This
1641 See supra note 107.
December 1991]	 CANONISTIC CONTRIBUTION	 73
discussion should begin to elucidate the role rights played in thir-
teenth century canon law.
I. The Facultas Contrahendi Matrimonium
The canonists used several technical terms, apart from the word
juts, to designate what we call a right. As noted above, one such term
is facultas. Facultas was most frequently used by the canonists to
refer to what could be called a Hohfeldian liberty or privilege.
Individuals, by virtue of operating within canon law, enjoyed a
number of basic faculates. 16 ' This section will focus on the devel-
opment of one such facultas—the facultas contrahendi matrimonium,
the faculty of contracting marriage. 16"
Gratian confronted a tradition that gave considerable weight
to the wishes of parents in the marriage plans of their children.
Roman law, for example, made the consent of the parties funda-
mental to the formation of marriage but at the same time gave
parents wide latitude to dictate or to approve of the selection of
spouses for their offspring. Thus, a son compelled by his father to
marry a woman he would otherwise not have chosen was neverthe-
less deemed to have married validly; he was irrebuttably presumed
to have consented to his father's wishes.'" A daughter's freedom
was even more sharply limited. Although a son might presumably
object in advance to any potential arranged marriage, a daughter
might object only where the man was "morally unworthy and
foul."'"
The Justinianic texts also contain a detailed set of regulations
governing the parental permission required for marriage. Sons and
daughters under parental power were required to obtain parental
consent in order to contract marriage." Additionally, daughters sui
161 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
1" The use of the word facultas to describe the freedom to contract marriage occurs
occasionally in Roman law. Thus, a rescript of Diocletian, CODE J. 5.4.14, states: "neque ab
initio matrimonium contrahere neque dissociatum reconciliare quisquam cogi protest. Unde
intelligis liberam facultatem contrahendi atque distrahendi matrimonii transferri ad neces-
sitatem non oportere." See also CODE J. 5.4.21. The expression facultas contrahendi matrimonium,
or variations on it, became standard in thirteenth century decretal law. See, e.g., X 4.15.1;
X 4.15.3.
163 See generally P.E. CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE (1930) (discussing the role
consent played in Roman matrimonial law). Si patre cogente created an irrebuttable presump-
tion in favor of consent where the son did not object to paternal arrangements prior to the
wedding. See DIG. 23.2.22.
1 " DEG. 23.1.12.
166 J. INST. 1.10.
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juris under the age of twenty-five were required to obtain fatherly
approval priorto marriage. 166 Where a father was unable to consent
because of absence, , mental illness or other impediment, the law
provided for other .family, members or the courts to assume this
responsibility. 167 What emerges from a reading of the Justinianic
texts on marriage is. a ,complex regulatory scheme that considerably
•	 -	 .
circumscribed the . principle, of . free consent of the parties. This
schenie ascribed a legally significant role in marital decision-making
to both the father and the larger family unit.
Gratian addressed , both of, these issues. He emphatically ,re-
jected the possibility that coerced consent could validate a mar-
riage. 168 He began hii analysts by, asking whether a daughter could
be given in marriage against her will 16 9
 The sources Gratian relied
on were few in number and not ihe , strongest supports for the
conclusion he desired to reach. Relying on two letters of Pope Urban
-	 . „
II, a letter of Pope Nicholai I and an excerpt from a commentary
on Corinthians attributed, probably . ineorrectly, to Ambrose, Gratian
decisively and without analysis asserted, "by these authorities it is
clearly shown that there is to be no joining to another except by
free will."'" The Roman law tradition that equated filial submission
to paternal arrangements with free consent Was thereby implicitly
rejected; hence forward, a daughter or son compelled to marry
someone not of her or his choosing could subsequently challenge
the arrangement.
Gratian's treatment of parental consent was less straightfor
ward. What is possibly Gratian's most direct statement on the subject
occurs in a dictum in Causa 32, but the dictum does not lend itself
to easy interpretation. Commenting on a statement of Pope Leo I
that referred in passing to marriages arranged by "paternal judg-;
ment," Gratian stated:
When it is said by paternal judgment women [are] joined
to men it is given to understand that paternal consent is
desirable in marriage, nor should legitimate marriage take
place without it, as is said by Pope Evaristus: "It is other-
'° CODE" 5.9.20.
167 See., e.g., CODE J. 5.4.1.
1" Gratian treated the issue of coerced consent at Causa 31 questio 2. My discussion of
the issue of coerced consent in Gratian relies heavily on John Noonan's Power to Choose, 4
VIATOR 419 (1973).
169 Gratian seemed to assume that a son could not legally be compelled into an unwanted
marriage.
' 7° C.31 9.2 d.p.c.4.
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wise not a legitimate marriage unless she is handed over
by the parents."'"
The difficulty with this passage lies in the term "legitimate mar-
riage." A requirement for a legitimate marriage need not be a
requirement for a valid marriage. The canoeists distinguished be-
tween licit acts and valid acts. According to canonistic reasoning an
act might be illicit, that is, illegally done, but nevertheless be valid
and binding on the person who committed the act. By adopting a
term like "legitimate" Gratian avoided committing himself on the
question of the validity of such marriages. The best that can be said,
perhaps, is that Gratian was irresolvably ambiguous on the topic.'"
Although Gratian was studiously vague on the matter of pa-
rental permission, the decretists resolved this ambiguity in favor of
the freedom to contract marriage without first obtaining parental
approval. Rolandus engaged in fairly tortured reasoning to under-
cut the impact of Gratian's apparent approval of the "legitimacy"
of parental consent. Rolandus argued that Gratian's requirement
of parental approval applied only in the case of minors under the
age of twelve, who, in any event, could not validly marry but could
become betrothed. But, Rolandus continued, even in this situation
marriage must be chosen propria voluntate, by the minor's own will.'"
Rufinus dispensed with such juristic subtleties. Parental consent, in
Rufinus's estimation, was needed for a "more respectable and hon-
est marriage," ad verecundiorem honestatem conjugii, but was not
needed for validity.' 74 By the thirteenth century the rule was settled
that parental consent was unnecessary to a marriage's validity.' 75
The canon lawyers also accepted Gratian's repudiation of the
validity of coerced marriages. Popes quickly built a structure of law
around Gratian's recognition that coerced consent was no consent
at all. Three papal decretals were especially significant. Alexander
III issued Cum locum to resolve a dispute between two men of
01 C.32 q.2 d.p.c.12.
171 See Michael Sheehan, Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle Ages: Development and
Theory of Marriage, 1 Srun. IN MEDIEVAL. AND RENAISSANCE HIST., 1, 12-13 (n.s. 1978) (arguing
that Gratian may have had in mind the distinction between validity and licitness when he
asserted that parental consent was necessary for "legitimate" marriages). Sheehan neverthe-
less goes on to argue that other passages in Gratian make it likely that he believed parental
consent was needed for a valid marriage. Id, It is probably safer to agree with Brundage that
the question was simply "left open" by Gratian. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 238.
"' C.32 q.2 d.p.c.12.
"4 C.32 q.2 d.p.c.12. s.v. cum dicitur paterno arbitrio.
37d The Ordinary Gloss to the Decresum, C.32 q.2 d.p.c.12. s.v. legitime, explains "legiti-
mate" as the common legal solemnity associated with marriage.
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Pavia."8
 Each man had sought to marry a certain puella (girl) and
apparently had brought pressure to bear upon her. Alexander
opened his decretal with the broad statement of principle that "since
consent has no place where fear or compulsion intervenes it is
necessary that where someone's assent is required the stuff of com-
pulsion be repelled."'" To protect the girl's freedom, Alexander
ordered that she be placid in a secure house until she should decide
on a spouse. Cum locum can thus be seen as crystallizing the principle
articulated by Gratian. It recognized that true consent can only be
voluntary and that coercion has no place where consent is a require-
ment. What is missing from Cum locum, however, is a corresponding
legal protection.
A second decretal of Alexander III, Veniens ad nos responded
to this concern. 178
 Veniens ad nos legislated the remedy for coerced
marriages by declaring that such marriages were invalid. The de-
cretal also articulated the legal standard to be used in judging
whether a particular marriage was brought about through imper-
missible coercion. This was the steady man (constans vir) test. Con-
cerning this standard, John Noonan has stated that "a 'steady man'
was a fictional man of average fortitude who served in fear cases
much as a 'prudent man' is used to measure negligence in modern
tort law."'" Where a steady man would have been overwhelmed by
fear or unable to resist the force brought to bear against him, the
marriage was to be declared invalid.
Gregory IX's decretal Gemma is the third significant decretal.' 8°
Gregory IX responded to a betrothal agreement that contained a
penalty clause requiring the party breaching the agreement to for-
feit a fixed sum. Gregory labelled the clause "attempted extortion"
and invalidated it in the name of the principle libera matrimonia esse
debeant, marriages ought to be free.' 8 ' This decretal recognizes that
fear need not only be the product of physical threats. Financial and
other concerns might also give rise to an impermissible fear.' 82
"6 X 4.1.14.
'" Id. "Corn locum non habeat consensus ubi metus vel coactio intercedit, necesse est
ubi assensus cujusdam requiritur coactionis materia repellitur."
' 78 X 9.1.15.
' 79
 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Steady Man: Process and Policy in the Courts of the Roman
Curia, 58 CAL. L. REv. 628, 654 (1970). The "steady man" test was extended explicitly to
women in Honorius Ill's decretal Consultatitmi tulle, X 4.1.28.
' 8° X 4.1.29.
181 Id. "Libera matrimonia esse debeant."
182 Whether Gemma had much practical effect is difficult to judge. One can certainly
identify situations in the middle ages where parents exerted financial pressure on their
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The decretalists accepted the basic premise of this legislation.
They believed that marriages ought to be freely contracted. The
"steady man" test was unanimously adopted as the means by which
to measure coercion. Commenting on Alexander III's choice of the
term virum constantem (steady man), Bernard of Parma explicitly
connected the steady man doctrine with the liberty necessary to
contract marriage by stating that "he who consents ought to be
free." 18" In explaining Alexander III's decision to allow even the
plaintiff in Veniens ad nos, who must have been guilty either of
adultery or fornication, to take advantage of the steady man doc-
trine, Bernard stated that a person's fault is irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the level of fear invalidates the marriage. 18" Bernard
also agreed with the outcome in Gemma, noting that financial com-
pulsion is sufficient to invalidate consent.'"
The other decretalists essentially echoed Bernard's commen-
tary. Innocent IV largely restated Bernard's analysis, although with
occasional elaboration. Thus, Innocent observed that fear exerted
against third parties might sometimes invalidate consent. He illus-
trated this point with the example of a father who, facing death or
captivity, arranges a marriage for his daughter. The daughter, to
relieve her father's fear, follows through with the wedding. Such a
marriage is invalid, Innocent reasoned, unless the daughter con-
sented freely.'" Hostiensis also reiterated this accepted position with
little in the way of original commentary.' 87
Gratian's dicta, the teaching of decretists and decretalists, and
the legislation of popes all combined to create a zone of freedom.
3---This zone of freedom was not to be intruded upon by those not a
party to a marriage. It came to be called a facultas—the facultas
contrahendi matrimonium, the faculty of contracting marriage. It
should be evident that the faculty of contracting marriage was con-
sidered by the decretalists to have been a right. Analytically, this
facultas possesses elements of Hohfeld's notion of privilege and
offspring to marry in accord with parental wishes. Parents could and did, for example,
disinherit recalcitrant children who resisted parental marriage plans. See Juliette Turlan,
Recherches sur le manage dans la prolique tontumiere XII—XVIs., 35 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DR DROIT
FRANCAIS ET STRANGER 477, 487-89 (1957). At the same time, a writer such as Pierre de La
Palude cautioned fathers that they would commit a wrong by disinheriting children who
married clandestinely. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 443.
185 X 4.1.15 s.v. in virum constantern.
184 X 4.1.15 s.v. ut wcorem,
185 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 4.1.29 Ca. n5.
188 INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 4.1.14 s.v. coactio.
"7 See, e.g., HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.1.15 s.v. in coustantem.
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claim. It was a privilege because a person was free to exercise the
faculty or not exercise it as he or she saw fit. It was a claim because
of the correlative duty it placed on third parties not to bring coer-
cion to bear on the party contracting marriage.
Modern analyses of rights are concerned especially with em-
phasizing the role rights play as a limitation on state action. Richard
Flathman, for example, states that "Nery prominent in the modern
tradition of rights is the notion that rights should protect not free-
dom in general but specifically freedom from excessive interference
on the part of the state." 88
 The thirteenth century presented a
different situation. Governments were not yet seen as potentially
all-pervasive mechanisms of coercion. Rather, many persons saw
government as a source of stability and order. This is not to say,
however, that rights were not successfully asserted against govern-
mental entities, as sometimes this occurred.' 89
Of great importance to thirteenth century life, though, was the
potentially coercive role of the family. Dynastic considerations, in-
cluding arranged marriages, were a large part of family life, espe-
cially among the aristocratic and moneyed elements of society. 19°
The free faculty to contract marriages, supported by the ultimate
sanction of invalidity, was an important "trump" to play in this
context. Matters of dynastic policy could be frustrated by the free
assertion of the individual right to contract marriage.
The basic freedom to contract marriage was protected not only
by the evolution of the force and fear doctrine, but also by the
application of a rule of interpretation that allowed canonists to
construe narrowly any legislation prohibiting individuals from mar-
riage. Legislation prohibiting marriage would be considered prohi-
bitoria edicta, prohibitory edicts, and all individuals not expressly
forbidden to marry were permitted to marry. 191
L88
 RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 154 (1976).
189 Gregory IX's decretal Cum inferior, X 1.33.16, is a helpful example of rights success-
fully claimed against a superior authority. The decretal involved a bishop who wished to
erect his cathedral church in the territory of a particular archdeacon but who was impeded
from doing so by the archdeacon's continued assertion of jurisdictional rights. Gregory IX
excoriated the archdeacon for his "audacity" and "temerity" in violating the hierarchical
structure of the Church but closed his decretal by instructing that the archdeacon receive
appropriate compensation (recompensationem ... congruentem) in the event his rights were
injured (si ex hoc archidiaconi ... jura latduntur).
1 " BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 938. Diane Owen Hughes has studied, among other
topics, some of the familial constraints that served to limit the free choice of marital partners.
See Diane Owen Hughes, Urban Growth and Family Structure in Medieval Genoa, 66 PAST AND
PRESENT 3 (T.H. Aston ed., 1975).
19' What the decretalists meant by prohibitory edict is that, in certain areas of law, they
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What this interpretative rule meant in practice was that all those
not clearly unable to exchange the consent needed to contract mar-
riage—for example, the insane—or to engage in sexual inter-
course—the impotent or frigid—were not to have their right to
marry denied. Invoking this principle, Innocent III recognized in
two decretals that deaf-mutes did not need to use words and could
marry by exchanging signs. 192 Alexander III permitted lepers to
marry if they could find willing spouses.'" Also, Raymond of Pen-
afort made sure to include in Liber Extra a decretal of Pope Hadrian
IV permitting servi (slaves or serfs) to marry freely, even when their
masters objected.'"
The decretalists accepted and expanded upon these categories.
In glossing Cum aped, Hostiensis acknowledged as correct the in-
terpretive principle used by innocent III and tested its limits by
inquiring whether somedne could still marry if he or she was not
only deaf and mute but also blind. Hostiensis replied in the affir-
mative.'" In glossing Dignum, Bernard of Parma noted that the
decretal's holding, which literally applied only to marriages between
servi, could be extended to marriages between servi and free persons
provided the free parties were aware of their prospective spouse's
servile status. 196 Bernard of Parma also narrowly construed at least
one of the two categories of those unable to contract marriage. The
will narrowly construe any legislation restricting freedom of action. Thus, for example,
Hostiensis notes that one may freely postulate a candidate to office unless clearly restricted
by law just as one might make a will or marry. HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA Bk. I, De postulando II 2.
There is inherent in this type of reasoning a certain circularity, unless one already has in
mind a prior conception of situations where freedom of action is to prevail and where it is
to be restricted. The decretalists had such a prior conception in the case of marriage law.
192 X 4.1.23; X 4.1.25.
193
 X 4.8.2.
19, X 4.9.1. Hadrian IV's decretal and the commentary it generated on the marriages
of serfs is the subject of an exhaustive study by Peter Landau. See Peter Landau, Hadrian
IV Dekreiale "Dignum Est" (X 4.9.1) und die Eheschliessung Unfreier in der Diskussion von Kanonisten
und Theologen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts, 12 STUDIA GRATIANA (Collectanea Stephan Kuttner
II) 511 (1967). Both decretists and decretalists generally favored the freedom of serfs to
contract marriage, even over the objections of the serfs' masters. The freedom of serfs to
marry was grounded on a variety of principles, but at least one decretist, Sicard of Cremona,
asserted a natural law foundation for the freedoM:
Deinde queritur utrum nescientibus dominis vel etiam scientibus et contradi-
centibus matrimonium sit inter servum et ancillam. Quod fit in hunt modum.
Omnes homines de naturaii jure sunt liberi, quia et isti. Unde et ea que sunt
juris naturalis possum facere. Set conjunctio marls et femine est de jure naturali,
ergo et isti possunt contrahere matrimonium.
Id. at 532 n.99 (quoting Sicard of Cremona at C.29 q.2 c.8).
195 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.1.23 S.V. ad quod.
196 X 4.9.1 s.v. inter servos.
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insane, Bernard argued, might contract marriage during a lucid
interval.' 97
The doctrine on prohibitory edicts was directed against a po-
tentially broader range of interference than the doctrine on force
and fear. To be sure, the rule at least theoretically embraced families
that might have forbidden their deaf-mute or blind children to
marry.'" But the rule also was directed against public authority of
various sorts. Bishops and pastors were not to deny marriage to the
protected classes of individuals. Feudal lords were not to prohibit
their serfs from marriage. Cities and communes were not to legislate
against the marriages of lepers. Comparable in its intended opera-
tion to the strict scrutiny standard of modern fundamental rights
cases, the rule on prohibitory edicts imposed an exacting standard
on legislation restricting the right to marriage. Legislation restrict-
ing this right was automatically suspect.
What is significant for the purposes of this discussion is the role
this right played within the entire structure of the law of marriage.
The basic right to contract marriage was not, to use Michel Villey's
language, a "vague and subordinate" part of the law. Rather, it was
fundamental to the operation of matrimonial law. A marriage had
to be freely entered to be valid. This was a right assertable chiefly
against familial authority, but it was also assertable in certain con-
texts against public authority. One could not be compelled unwill-
ingly into marriage and legislation restricting the right to marry was
suspect. Deaf-mutes, lepers, serfs and the blind were all free to
marry. This principle led to the creation of a legally safeguarded
zone of personal freedom.
2. The jus Conjugate
The decretalists divided marriage juristically into two compo-
nents, the vinculum, or matrimonial bond, and the jus conjugate, or
the right of each party to claim sexual intercourse from the other.
The jus conjugate was a right of which parties were ordinarily not
HI X 4.1.24 s.v. furore. The decretalists seem to have been untroubled by interracial
marriages. Legislation in the crusading kingdom was directed against interreligious, not
interracial, marriages. James A. Brundage, Prostitution, Miscegenation, and Sexual Purity in the
First Crusade, in CRUSADE AND SETTLEMENT: PAPERS READ AT THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF THE CRUSADES AND THE LATIN EAST AND PRESENTED TO R.C. SMAIL
57 (P.W. Edbury ed., 1985).
158 Bernard de Montmirato recognized that children denied marriage by their parents
might bring a cause of action against them. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 431.
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to be deprived. This section will consider the "due process" safe-
guards that were erected around this right.
The jus conjugale had its origin in the Pauline notion of the
conjugal debt. Paul wrote in his First Letter to the Corinthians:
Let the husband render to the wife what is her due
and likewise the wife to her husband. A wife has no au-
thority over her body, but her husband; likewise, the hus-
band has no authority over his body, but his wife. You
must not refuse each other except by consent, for a time,
that you might give yourself to prayer, and return to-
gether again lest Satan tempt you because you lack self-
control. But I say this by way of concession, not com-
mond. 199
The term that is translated above as "due" is the Greek word opheile.
Opheile unambiguously meant what was owing. It was a debt."° In
the Vulgate, Jerome translated opheile as debitum.20 ' The notion of
what was owing or due was preserved by this translation.
The canonists transformed this debitum from a moral obligation
founded on scriptural exhortation into a judicially enforceable
right. 202 The operation of the jus conjugale can be compared to the
199 I Corinthians 7:3-7.
200 See HENRY G. LIDDELL 8C RUPERT Scow, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1277 (1940).
201 For Jerome's translation of opheile, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A
HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 42 (enlarged
ed., 1986).
202 Authors occasionally described the conjugal debt as a conjugal right well before the
thirteenth.century. For example, Augustine in his treatise de bond conjugali stated "viros tamen
suos plerumque edam continere cupientes ad reddendum carnale debitum cogunt non
desiderio prolix sed ardore concupiscientiae ipso sun jure intemperanter utentes in quarum
tamen nuptiis bonum est hoc ipsum quod nuptae sunt." 41 CORPUS SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIAS-
TICORUM LATINORUM 194. What is missing in Augustine, however, is any sort of systematic
legal analysis of this right. Further, no due process protection is accorded it. Analysis and
protection of the jus conjugale as a legal right can first be found in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. On the development of the conjugal debt in the legal thinking of the canonists of
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Elizabeth M. Makowski, The Conjugal Debt and
Medieval Canon Law, 3 J. MEDIEVAL HIST. 99 (1977). The jus conjugale was one of the few
areas of legal equality between men and women. See James A. Brundage, Sexual Equality in
Medieval Canon Law, in MEDIEVAL WOMEN AND THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL HISTORY 66 ( Joel
T. Rosenthal ed., 1990).
Bernhard Bruns makes the point that the canonistic transformation of the conjugal debt
into a set of correlative rights and duties was quite foreign to Pauline theology. See Bernhard
Bruns, Die Frau hat Ober ihren Lieb nicht die Verfilgungsgewalt, sondern der Mann . . . Zur Herhunft
and Bedeutung der Formtdierung in Kor 7:4, 33 MUNCHENER THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 177,
194 (1982).
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correlation of rights and duties described by David Lyons. Lyons
identified a "familiar class of cases" where a tight correlation exists
between right and duties. For example, A lends B ten dollars. A
tight correlation exists between A's right, or claim, to payment and
B's obligation to pay. A may assert his claim, defer it or renounce it
altogether, but should A assert it, B is obliged to render his duty.
Lyons proposed a formal definition for this type of correlation,
stating that "[Ole rule is that the expression of the content of the
right is related to the content of obligation as the passive is related
to the active voice."205 Thus, for example, A's right to be obeyed
correlates with B's duty to obey.
The canonists' description of the jus conjugate satisfies Lyons'
formal definition. The content of the jus conjugate is the expectation
that each party will be obeyed when requesting sexual intercourse
from the other. This right correlates with the spouse's duty to obey.
By the thirteenth century, the Catholic Church was generally
recognized as possessing exclusive jurisdiction over marriage cases
throughout western Europe. 204 The jus conjugate became the means
by which the decretalists regulated relations between the parties to
a marriage. A maxim of canon law held that no one was to be
deprived of his or her right without fault.205 The principle under-
lying this maxim—that unjust deprivations of rights should be
avoided—was systematically applied to marriage cases by the can-
onists.206 Thus, an examination of the decretalists' treatment of the
jus conjugate is a particularly useful vehicle by which to explore
decretalist conceptions of due process as applied to unjust depri-
vations of rights. The extent to which the decretalists protected
parties from unjust deprivations of the jus conjugate can be seen in
three distinct contexts: renunciations of rights, divorce actions and
interference by public authority. Each of these areas will be exam-
ined in turn.
2°3 Lyons, supra note 91, at 46-49.
264 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 223-25, 319-23, 404-14 (discussing the growth of
exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction).
2°6 The expression Immo jure sup privan debet sine culpa occurs regularly in both papal
decretal letters and decretalist commentaries. It became a cornerstone of decretalist notions
of due process.
206 For applications of this maxim of law to marriage law see X 4.13.6; X 4.13.11 (where
Gregory IX used the virtual equivalent "ne jure suo sine sua propria culpa fraudetur");
BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 4.13.1 s.v. Mere; BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY
GLOSS X 2.27.10 s.v. exccedat.
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a. Renunciations of Rights
A series of decretals by Alexander III established the ground
rules for the renunciation of the jus conjugale. 207 The typical case of
renunciation was assumed to be the entry of one of the spouses into
religious life. Because entry into religious life required a vow of
continence, it had the effect of depriving the other spouse of his or
her conjugal right. Therefore, the deprived party's permission had
to be obtained before the departure of the other spouse would be
allowed.
This rule was workable as long as both parties freely renounced
the jus conjugate and were prepared for all that such a renunciation
entailed. But title 32 of Book III of the Liber Extra, which dealt with
the entry of married persons into religious life, stands as ample
testimony to the fact that parties to a marriage sometimes objected
strenuously to the departure of their spouses to the higher calling
of a religious vocation. The decretals found in this tide, and the
commentary that grew up around them, can be described fairly as
a practical elaboration of nemo privari jure suo sine culpa debet, the
rule that no person was to be deprived of his or her rights without
fault.
A number of circumstances might give rise to invalid renuncia-
dons. For example, the decretal Veniens illustrates that both force
and fraud could render a renunciation invalid. 2°8 In Veniens, a cer-
tain husband L. pressured his wife by threatening that he would
render himself useless both to himself and to the whole world if
she did not agree to renounce her right. 209 Priests accompanying L.
also failed to tell his wife that she would be expected to enter
religious life after renouncing her right. Innocent III found non
modicum deliquisse, "not a little fault," in L.'s conduct. Innocent,
however, ultimately decided against ordering L. restored to his wife
because she had had several adulterous relationships after ren-
ouncing her right. Her adultery prevented her from bringing a
claim for restitution."'
The commentators immediately recognized that the wife would
have been able to obtain restitution had she not engaged in adultery.
207
	
X 3.32.1; X 3.32.2; X 3.32.3; X 3.32.4; X 3.32.6; X 3.32.7; X 3.32.8.
208 X 3.32.16.
"g Leaving nothing to the imagination, Hostiensis noted that L. meant by this threat
self-castration. See HOSTIENSIS, LECTUIL X 3.32.16 s.v. inutitem.
21° X 3.32.16.
84	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:37
Bernard of Parma asserted that fraud would have been sufficient
to void the agreement if the woman had remained continent. 2 " He
also stated that, had the wife not prejudiced herself, the permission
she granted to L. would have been invalid because of L.'s threats.212
Hostiensis noted that the woman only seemed to renounce her
right. 2" He asserted that, had L.'s wife remained continent, L. could
have been removed from the monastery and restored to the woman
even after making a solemn religious profession. 214
A second decretal of Innocent III, Accedens, 215 dealt with even
more overt pressure. A husband beat and threatened his wife until
she agreed to permit him to enter a monastery. After repeated
blows and threats she acceded to his demands and entered a convent
herself. With the passage of time, however, the man found that
religious life was not to his liking and withdrew from the monastery.
His wife then left the convent and sued to have her husband re-
stored to her. Innocent III held that, if the facts were as alleged,
the husband was to be restored to the wife. 216
The commentators focused their energies on the question of
whether the husband, given his prior action, was able to seek the
conjugal debt. Bernard of Parma argued that the husband was
unable to seek the conjugal debt because he had renounced this
right by entering the monastery, but that he was able to render the
conjugal debt when it was demanded of him. 2 " Hostiensis agreed
with Bernard, stating that the man had renounced his right and
therefore was unable to seek the conjugal debt, but was to render
it when it was sought. 218 The commentaries of Bernard and Hos-
tiensis became the standard rule where one party withdrew from
the marriage in order to enter religious life but subsequently re-
turned to the world. 219
This rule may seem like a bizarre way to regulate marital re-
lations, but it illustrates the connection that the canonists perceived
between due process and rights. As matters of principle, the decre-
talists recognized that a person was free to renounce his or her own
111 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 3.32.16 Cana.
212 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 3.32.16 iv. captiose asseruit.
213 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 3.32.16 s.v. audienda.
114 Id.
213 X 3.32.17.
219 Id.
217 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 3.32.17 S.V. processes veto temporis.
213 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 3.32.17 s.v. exhibeat.
213 ADHtMAR ESMEIN, II LE MARIAGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE 28-29 (1895).
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rights, but could not prejudice the rights of another person. 22° They
also recognized as a basic principle that no one was to lose his or
her rights through no fault of their own.
The rules on restoration in cases of coerced renunciation were
simply an elaboration on these principles. L.'s wife had committed
adultery; hence, she was no longer without fault and could not seek
restitution. But the wife in Accedens was blameless, and so was able
to seek restitution and claim the conjugal debt once her husband
was restored to her. Furthermore, because a person was free to
renounce his or her own right but unable to prejudice someone
else's right, that person might lose the capacity to claim the conjugal
debt, yet still remain under an obligation to render it.
b. Divorce and the Termination of the Jus Conjugale
In thirteenth century canon law, divorce was understood to
result in the termination of the conjugal right, although the mar-
riage bond itself would continue to endure. A party would be free
of the obligations of marriage and could leave his or her spouse,
although thereafter neither party would be free to marry. Only the
death of one of the spouses or a declaration of nullity might free a
party to marry again. 221
The decretalists recognized three grounds for divorce: adul-
tery, "spiritual fornication" and saevitia (violence). 222 Adultery was
permitted as a ground for divorce on the basis of scriptural au-
thority.225 "Spiritual fornication," which was understood as a lapse
into heresy, or conversion to Judaism or Islam, was treated analo-
gously to carnal adultery. Like the non-offending spouse in an
adultery case, the Catholic Christian spouse in cases of spiritual
fornication was free to seek an ecclesiastical divorce.
The third ground, saevitia, developed over the course of the
thirteenth century. Its foundation was built on a decretal of Alex-
ander 111, 224 and on a decretal of Innocent 111. 225 Each decretal
225 See, e.g., BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 3.30.31 s.v. nullatenus derogetur
("nunquam enim intelligitur derogari juris alterius"). As employed by Bernard of Parma,
this maxim is applied to the interpretation of papal rescripts. Not even rescripts of the pope
were to be understood as infringing the rights of third parties.
221 See ESMEIN, supra note 219, at 85-95; R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 100-01 (1974) for a discussion of the development of the canon law of
divorce.
229
	
Esmensr, supra note 219, at 85-95.
Matthew 19:9.
2" X 2.13.8.
225
 X 2.12.13.
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involved a husband who was seeking the restoration of his wife.
The wife in each case objected to the restoration because of the
husband's violence. Both Alexander and Innocent resolved the issue
by ordering the judge not to restore the wife to her husband if his
violence was obvious, and to provide instead for her safekeeping;
It seems that originally saevitia served simply as a means of
blocking judicially-mandated restitution. This, at least, is how Ber-
nard of Parma understood the two decretals.22& Hostiensis, however,
interpreted saevitia as providing grounds for divorce, and this is
how the decretals were subsequently understood. 227
In all other cases, the law was understood to forbid separation.
Parties were required to live together and to render the conjugal
debt when it was sought. To do otherwise would be to deprive one's
spouse of his or her right. 228
The limits of this desire to protect rights were tested in the
case of a spouse who contracted leprosy. Leprosy was a dreaded
and fearful disease in the thirteenth century. Lepers, who were
without hope for cure and were thought to present the risk of
deadly contagion, were ostracized socially and legally. 229 Lepers
were segregated from the larger society. 23° This separation was
often accomplished with considerable liturgical pomp, including a
symbolic buria1. 2" A comprehensive set of legal regulations govern-
ing this separation developed. 232 Some monarchs, however, dis-
pensed with legal niceties and executed lepers in various grisly
ways.233 Throughout Europe, lepers were required to wear distinc-
tive clothing, live in isolation and warn the healthy of their presence
by rattles, bells or other instruments. 234
Marriage, however, represented an exception to this rule of
separation. Alexander III declared in two decretals that a healthy
spouse was not to separate from a spouse who had contracted
leprosy. In Pervenit, Alexander condemned a local custom that per-
211' BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 2.13.8 castes; X 2.13.13 CaSUS.
HELMHOLZ, supra note 221, at 100-01, 105.
n° BRUNDAGE, supra note 14, at 370-73; 453-56.
"a SAUL N. BRODY, THE DISEASE OF THE SOUL: LEPROSY IN MEDIEVAL LITERATURE 60-
86 (1974).
'" Id. at 60-71.
"I Id, at 65-66.
2" Edouard Jeanselme, CO/tOrteril l'Eurape, au Mayen Age, se pralégea mare la lipre, 25
BULLETIN DE LA soctATE FRANCAISE D'HISTOIRE DE LA MEDECINE I (1931) (the most compre-
hensive survey of the legal regulation of leprosy in the middle ages).
2" BRODY, supra note 229, at 69.
"4 Id. at 67-68.
December 1991]	 CANONISTIC CONTRIBUTION 	 87
mitred separation. Because husband and wife are made one flesh,
Alexander reasoned, the healthy spouse was to remain with the
leprous one and minister to him or her with conjugal affection. 255
In Quoniam, Alexander asserted that, as separation was permitted
only on account of adultery, spouses may not separate because one
of them had contracted leprosy. Furthermore, Alexander stated, if
the leprous spouse requested the conjugal debt the healthy partner
was obligated to render it. To Alexander's mind, Paul's exhortation
did not admit of exceptions. 238
Alexander, it seems, reached these conclusions through a cer-
tain rigid literalism, The Matthean divorce text recognized adultery
by one of the spouses as the only ground for divorce, and the first
letter to the Corinthians seemed to permit no exceptions to the rule
that parties were obliged to render the conjugal debt. Alexander
must have assumed that he was doing nothing more than applying
clear scriptural texts to an obvious case. The decretalists, however,
analyzed this problem in terms of rights. Might a leprous spouse
continue to demand the conjugal right, and might the healthy one
be compelled to render it?
Bernard of Parma asserted that the healthy spouse need not
be compelled to share the same bed or same house with the leprous
spouse. Furthermore, the leprous spouse should not be overly
wicked in exacting his or her right. Bernard, however, concluded
that if the healthy spouse refused the leprous spouse completely,
he or she could be compelled to render the debt. This was because
the leprous spouse was not to be defrauded of the conjugal debt. 237
Hostiensis largely agreed with Bernard. By "minister," Hostien-
sis explained, Alexander III meant that the 'healthy spouse should
provide the leprous spouse not only with the necessities of life but
also with the conjugal debt. Echoing Bernard, he asserted that the
healthy spouse was so obliged because the leprous spouse was not
to be defrauded of the debt. Hostiensis further indicated that,
where the healthy spouse refused to render the debt, he or she
could be compelled to do so by ecclesiastical sanction. 238 Hostiensis
was both more explicit and more nuanced than Bernard as to the
level of compulsion that could be brought to bear on the healthy
spouse. Hostiensis acknowledged that refusal to render the debt
235 X 4.8.1.
236 X 4.8.2.
232 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 4.8.1 s.u. minis:red.
279 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.8.1 sx. minis:1TM.
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would amount to a mortal sin. Nonetheless, Hostiensis was reluctant
to employ the sanction of excommunication against the healthy
spouse. The healthy spouse simply might be incapable of rendering
the debt because of the horror of the disease, and one should not
be held to do the impossible under a sentence of excommunica-
tion.239
The decretalists' analysis appears to be a decided shift away
from Alexander's literalism. The decretalists confronted the issue
of the leprous spouse by reference to their understanding of due
process and rights. The leprous spouse was not to be defrauded of
his or her right. The leprous spouse should be restrained in seeking
his or her right, but, where it was demanded, the healthy partner
was obliged to render it. The coercive power of the church might
be brought to bear upon a healthy spouse who refused to render
the debt. The leprous spouse was not to be deprived of his or her
right without fault.
c. The Jus Conjugale and Feudal Authority
In the thirteenth century, a number of entities were capable of
exercising coercive authority over individuals. As noted, familial
authority was a powerful influence. Additionally, municipal govern-
ments were often a source of authority over their citizens, as were
the newly consolidating monarchies over their subjects. 24° Various
officers of the Church were also capable of exercising considerable
coercive authority. 24'
But did those persons subject to a particular coercive authority
possess any rights assertable against that authority? It seems that
they did. This has been shown by the case of children desiring to
marry against the wishes or arrangements of their parents. A
second such example is the balance struck by the decretalists be-
tween the right of a serf, or his wife, to the conjugal debt and the
authority of manor lords over their serfs.
The Latin word for serf was serous, which might also mean
slave. This conflation of terminology creates confusion as to whether
the decretalists, when discussing the status of servi, actually meant
slaves or simply meant serfs. Although this is a complex question,
some cursory observations are in order. Slavery, as it was understood
239
 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.8.2 s.v. praecepto apostaii.
' 4° BERMAN, .supra note 1, at 357-403, 404-81.
941 Id. at 225-54.
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in the classical Roman world, was a clearly diminished but not
entirely extinct institution in the thirteenth century. 242 The practice
of serfdom was itself a complex matter. The classical distinction
between serfdom and slavery is that serfs were bound to the land
while slaves were the chattels of particular owners. This distinction,
however, was sometimes blurred in practice. 243 Buckland states that,
at Roman law, the slave was largely "rightless." 244 At English com-
mon law, in contrast, the serf had certain rights assertable against
his lord. 245 The same holds true for the serous under canon law.
Whether understood ultimately as slaves or serfs, the jus conjugate
was one such right assertable by semi under canon law.
The decretalists recognized that it was necessary to balance
rights in the case of the jus conjugate of serfs. Lords had a jus in
their serfs, 246 but so also did the wives of the serfs. 247 Echoing prior
decretist commentaries, 248 Bernard of Parma, in balancing these
two claims, was willing to give priority to the claims of wives, at least
in most circumstances. Bernard discussed the conflicting priorities
that existed when a lord demanded servitium of a serf and the man's
wife demanded the conjugal debt at the same time. Some say the
lord should be obeyed, Bernard began, unless it is feared that the
wife will fornicate or otherwise be prejudiced greatly by her hus-
band's service. Bernard, however, thought the priorities should be
reversed. The serf-husband should ordinarily render the debt first,
since his lord would only be slightly prejudiced by the modest delay
this would cause. The only exception Bernard recognized was where
the serf was obliged to render personal assistance to his lord.
Bernard's answer did not go unchallenged. Innocent IV flatly
rejected Bernard's conclusion. Innocent began his.analysis by stating
that a lord seemed to be acting maliciously by not allowing his servus
at least a little time to satisfy his wife. Nonetheless, Innocent con-
cluded, a servus is unable to prejudice a prior obligation, namely his
242 Sheehan, Theory. and Practice: Marriage of the Unfree and the Poor in Medieval Society, 50
MEDIAEVAL STUD. 457, 463-65 (1988).
243 HYAMS, supra note 15, at 126-51.
244 W.W. BucKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 62
(1921).
245 HYAMS, supra note 15, at 126-51.
246 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.9.1 s.v. a sacramentis. The balance to be struck between the
master's right in the serf and the serf's right to marriage and the conjugal debt was a
recurrent one in both the decretist and decretalist literature. See Landau, supra note 194, at
535-46.
347 BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 4.9.1 s.v. servitia.
24B See Landau, supra note 194, at 535.
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obligation to render service to his lord. Therefore, the man ought
to obey his lord unless there is a significant possibility that his wife
might commit adultery. 249
In his Summa, Hostiensis generally agreed with Bernard. Where
a lord will be greatly prejudiced by his serous's absence, as, for
example, when he is under attack, the serous ought to render service
first to his lord. Otherwise, the lord should be obligated to wait a
little time for his serous, as there is no great loss in a short wait. 25°
In his Lectura, however, Hostiensis reversed the presumption, de-
claring that unless great prejudice would result, or there is fear of
fornication, the lord should be obeyed first. 25 '
What is significant in this discussion is the balance the decre-
talists struck. Both lord and wife possessed certain jura. The decre-
talists did not automatically yield to the lord's claims simply because
he occupied a more favorable position in the medieval hierarchy.
Rather, the decretalists were quite willing to balance the lord's claim
with the wife's claim in an attempt to ensure that the parties were
not deprived of their rights through any fault of their own. Once
again, the relationships generated by rights are clearly visible at
work with an operative concept of due process of law.
This review of the role played by rights in the marriage law of
the thirteenth century church is by no means comprehensive. Mar-
riage law is saturated with a concern for rights, as are other areas
of the canon law. This review, however, has demonstrated that rights
did not occupy a vague and subordinate concept in thirteenth cen-
tury decretal law, but formed an indispensable part of the law.
A marriage could only be brought into being by the free and
uncoerced exercise of the right of each party. This right was pro-
tected by a sophisticated and comprehensive structure of law. Sim-
ilarly, the ongoing functions of a marriage were analyzed in terms
of tightly correlating rights and duties. In turn, these rights were
protected by the canonists' evolving concept of due process. No one
was to lose his or her right without fault, a principle that was
operative in guiding the decretalists in analyzing when and how the
jus conjugale might be lost. The canonists understood that conflicting
rights had to be balanced. An example of this balancing was seen
in the case of the marriage of serfs. Blameless parties, even in the
149 INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA, X 4.9.1 s.v. servilia.
2" HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA, Bk. IV, De conjugio servorum § 4.
231 HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA X 4.9.1 s.v. exhiberi.
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extreme case of leprous spouses, were to be protected in the pos-
session of their rights. Rights and right holders were to be respected.
CONCLUSION
The two overarching goals of this paper have been to demon-
strate that the concept of individual rights was present in western
law at a time earlier than commonly supposed by historians of rights
and that the concept of legal rights was essential to the functioning
of medieval canon law. First, the received historiography of the
concept and vocabulary of rights rests on questionable presuppo-
sitions and glaring omissions. Except for Brian Tierney's work,
canon law has never been seriously considered as a possible source
for the western rights tradition by those writing explicitly on the
history of the concept of rights. When examined in light of the
work of modern analytical philosophers such as Wesley Hohfeld,
however, the existence of a sophisticated and thorough rights vo-
cabulary in thirteenth century canon law is evident. For example,
all of Hohfeld's jural categories can be identified as operative in the
canon law's use of the term jus. The canonists also had an explicit
awareness of the distinction between active and passive rights. The
case against the received historiography is well established.
Further, it now should be evident that rights were not a vague
and subordinate part of canon law. As has been shown, marriage
itself came about through the free exercise of a right, the facultas
contrahendi matrimonium. The relations of the two parties to a mar-
riage were regulated by means of reference to the jus conjugate, the
conjugal right. Moreover, an operative concept of due process—
crystallized in the maxim nemo jure suo privari debet sine culpa----
protected blameless parties in the exercise of this right. The concept
of individual rights, as explored through the example of the law of
marriage, played a significant role in many areas of thirteenth cen-
tury canon law.
In closing, one might observe that the history of the western
rights tradition remains to be written. William of Ockham, Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke will, of course, continue to figure promi-
nently in a new historiography of rights. But their relative positions
will need to be altered in some crucial respects. No longer should
it be possible to assert that the western rights tradition emerged
entirely from the brow of any one of these thinkers. Ockham,
Hobbes and Locke should each be seen as part of a larger tradition,
a tradition to which each adapted and creatively responded.
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The western rights tradition is a far larger and deeper phe-
nomenon than the received historiography recognizes. Medieval
canon law played an important role in this tradition. There are also
a number of other sources that remain to be examined. The Roman
lawyers of the late antique world, the medieval Roman glossators,
the common lawyers of medieval England, the scholastic philoso-
phers and the patristic and medieval scriptural commentators all
may prove to be productive and rich sources of the western rights
tradition. Thus, although this article is entitled "an historical in-
quiry," it might most appropriately be called a "preliminary in-
quiry." Much remains to be done.
